News and financial intermediation in aggregate and sectoral fluctuations by Görtz, Christoph & Tsoukalas, John
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
News and Financial Intermediation in
Aggregate and Sectoral Fluctuations
Görtz, Christoph and Tsoukalas, John
University of Birmingham
March 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40442/
MPRA Paper No. 40442, posted 03 Aug 2012 07:35 UTC
News and Financial Intermediation in Aggregate and
Sectoral Fluctuations∗
Christoph Görtz†and John D. Tsoukalas‡
First version: March 2011
This version: July 2012
Abstract
We estimate a two-sector DSGE model with financial intermediaries—a-la Gertler and Karadi
(2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)—and quantify the importance of news shocks in
accounting for aggregate and sectoral fluctuations. Our results indicate a significant role
of financial market news as a predictive force behind fluctuations. Specifically, news about
the value of assets held by financial intermediaries, reflected one to two years in advance in
corporate bond markets, generate countercyclical corporate bond spreads, affect the supply
of credit, and are estimated to be a significant source of aggregate fluctuations, accounting
for approximately 31% of output, 22% of investment and 31% of hours worked variation
in cyclical frequencies. Importantly, asset value news shocks generate both aggregate and
sectoral co-movement with a standard preference specification. Financial intermediation
is key for the importance and propagation of asset value news shocks.
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1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has highlighted the powerful role of the financial sector. Se-
vere disruptions in financial markets first reflected in movements of financial market indica-
tors, e.g., credit spreads on private sector assets were followed by significant declines in mea-
sures of real economic activity. During the “Great Recession”, real GDP (per capita) fell by
4.7%, private domestic investment (per capita) by 32%, and total non-farm business hours (per
capita) by 9.7%. There is a growing literature that establishes the predictive power of financial
market indicators for real macroeconomic aggregates (see for example Gilchrist et al. (2009),
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), Mueller (2009), Kurmann and Otrok (2012), Gomes and Schmid
(2009), Philippon (2009) among others). An appealing interpretation is that these indicators
may incorporate advance information or news about future economic developments, real or
financial in nature. In this paper we quantitatively explore the interaction between financial
markets, news shocks and the real economy using a two sector model.
There are several facts that motivate our approach. A careful look beyond the broad declines
reported above, reveals sectoral downturns that vary in severity, especially in hours worked.
Figure 1 shows the behavior of hours worked across two broad sectors of the economy, namely,
consumption and investment sectors (to be precisely defined later). While sectoral hours tend
to move together over the cycle, the extent of the recent downturn has been very uneven, with
investment sector hours (e.g. in industries such as construction, manufacturing, utilities) ex-
periencing a significant decline, while consumption sector hours (e.g. in industries such as
services, retail trade, finance) have been affected relatively less. Importantly, this pattern is
not unique to the last recession—it can also be observed in the two previous episodes. Thus,
hours worked in investment sector industries decline significantly more in recessions (see also
Table 1) thereby acting as a powerful drag on total hours in these periods of depressed activity.
In fact, total hours are strongly correlated with investment sector hours and only weakly so
with consumption sector hours, suggesting the importance of the former for the behavior of the
total. These simple facts serve to demonstrate the importance of looking beyond broad macroe-
conomic aggregates when studying the business cycle but also beg the question whether and to
what extent financial factors, as those experienced during the “Great Recession” can explain
(a) patterns of sectoral comovement and (b) sectoral differences suggested by Figure 1. Our
paper sets out to produce answers to these questions by adopting a multi sector approach.
The real side of the model builds on the two sector RBC model of Huffman and Wynne
(1999). We add nominal and real frictions that have been found to be important in recent
work (see e.g., Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007)) and introduce financial in-
termediation constraints as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The
financial sector holds corporate sector assets and in exchange provides financing for capital
expenditures, while being subject to a limit on how much leverage can be tolerated by depos-
itors. Leverage constraints effectively tie credit flows—from the financial sector to the real
economy—to the equity capital of intermediaries and create a feedback loop between equity
capital and asset prices. This framework allows for a quantitative investigation of real, nominal
and financial sources as drivers for aggregate and sectoral U.S. fluctuations.1
1Recently, DSGE studies have considered financial factors in business cycle models (see Christiano et al.
(2010), Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Christensen and Dib (2008), Jermann and Quadrini (2012) among others).
The majority of these studies rely on the framework proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999). However, in that ap-
proach, financial intermediation is a veil—what matters is the borrower’s balance sheet condition. A very limited
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We estimate—using Bayesian methods—the model on real, nominal and financial U.S. data
over the period, 1990Q2 to 2011Q1. Besides a host of real and nominal shocks previously con-
sidered in the literature, we introduce two types of financial shocks. First, shocks that affect the
value of assets held by intermediaries and second, shocks that capture exogenous movements
in intermediaries’ equity capital (equity capital shocks). We assume the former—in addition
to a purely unanticipated component—can encompass news components. These represent in-
formation received by agents in advance of the actual realization of the innovation and helps
in generating richer forecasts about the future value of assets—relative to a conventional spec-
ification with unanticipated shocks. Our motivation stems from recent work by Gilchrist et al.
(2009) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) who identify credit market factors from corporate
bond spreads that predict future movements in output, employment or industrial production
and work by Philippon (2009) who shows corporate bond market spreads to better anticipate—
compared to the stock market—future economic activity.2
We can summarize our results as follows. First, asset value news shocks explain a siz-
able fraction of fluctuations at business cycle frequencies, accounting for 31% of output, 22%
of investment and 31% of hours variation. Previous work (see Gertler and Karadi (2011),
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gourio (2012) ) has examined qualitatively the properties of purely
unanticipated shocks of this type in the context of one sector calibrated models. By considering
both unanticipated and news shocks our paper provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first
quantitative assessment of the magnitude and the relative importance of these different compo-
nents.3 Our estimation method exploits the fact that financial variables (corporate bond spreads
and equity capital) contain substantial information about asset value news shocks. We find the
quantitative importance of news shocks—in terms of accounting for the variance shares of real
macro variables reported above—approximately doubles when financial variables are included
in the estimation than if they are not. Consequently, the news component of asset value distur-
bances accounts for a significant fraction of the variation in corporate bond spreads and equity
capital. Its interesting to note, the data strongly favors news shocks that only directly affect
the value of assets in the consumption sector—investment sector asset value disturbances are
largely irrelevant for fluctuations. Instead, the data prefers to use the sectoral links of the model
as a natural propagation mechanism of consumption sector shocks across sectors.
Second, this type of financial news shock can generate aggregate and sectoral co-movement,
a pervasive stylized fact of business cycles and can explain the behavior of total hours worked
surprisingly well during recessions. The success in explaining the behavior of total hours during
recessions is linked to the fact these shocks almost entirely capture the declines in investment
sector hours during these periods, in line with the evidence presented in Figure 1. It is impor-
number of studies consider financial frictions that constrain the lending behavior of financial intermediaries (see
for example, Dib (2010), Gerali et al. (2010), Hirakata et al. (2011) and Villa (2010)).
2We inform the estimation with separate sectoral corporate bond spreads that in principle can help to identify
financial news shocks as they are likely to contain advance information in addition to what can be extracted from
real macroeconomic aggregates. In addition to corporate bond spreads we also include the equity capital of inter-
mediaries as an observable in estimation. Given our focus on credit supply factors and the role of equity capital
in determining the demand for assets by the financial sector, we believe it is important to inform the estimation
with a variable that determines the degree of leverage of financial intermediaries. Recent studies that exploit the
link between between financial markets and real economy and include financial market variables when estimating
DSGE models with news shocks include Christiano et al. (2010), Davis (2007), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012)).
3Gertler and Karadi (2011) call them capital quality shocks, while Gourio (2012) calls them depreciation
shocks.
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tant to note these co-movement properties of news shocks obtain with a standard preference
specification. It is useful to describe the intuition behind the transmission mechanism of an
asset value news shock. We focus on news received 2 years in advance of a decline in the value
of consumption sector assets. This is quantitatively the dominant news component borne out
by our estimates. There are two channels that propagate this shock in the model: a financial
channel and a real sectoral link channel. The former works through the leverage constraint
of intermediaries while the latter works through the demand from the consumption sector for
capital goods produced by the investment sector.
The financial channel begins to operate as soon as financial intermediaries receive the news
that asset values will decline in the future. Since asset prices are forward looking the value
of assets falls immediately, intermediaries cover losses from their buffer of equity capital and
respond by reducing leverage and consequently lending to the consumption sector. The spread
(difference between the return of corporate bonds and cost of funds for the bank) in that sector
rises immediately signalling the imminent deterioration in asset values and the increase in the
cost of lending to that sector. The reduction in lending hits production and factor input use
in the consumption sector. The two sector structure of the model propagates the shock to the
investment sector causing output in the latter to contract as demand for capital goods from
the consumption sector declines. The resulting decline in the demand for investment goods
causes hours worked to sharply fall in that sector, but also in the aggregate, generating behavior
of hours consistent with the observed movements documented above. All macroeconomic
quantities decline, both sectoral spreads rise and lending contracts as a result of the gloomy
news, generating aggregate and sectoral co-movement—bad news sets off a recession today in
both sectors. It is important to note that, as formally demonstrated in section 7, this type of
news shock cannot generate co-movement in the core of the two sector model where financial
frictions are absent, i.e. the financial channel described above is key for the propagation and
co-movement properties of the news shock.4
Our paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the importance of news shocks for aggregate
fluctuations and highlights a new—financial—channel that can generate quantitatively impor-
tant real effects of news shocks. Moreover, we also make some headway in addressing sectoral
co-movement with news shocks—a demanding challenge as illustrated by Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009). Earlier theoretical work, e.g. Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009), has shown it is possible to generate a broad based expansion with an news shock that
signals an improvement in total factor productivity (TFP). But subsequent empirical work has
produced mixed results. Using a VAR methodology, Beaudry and Portier (2006) report quanti-
tative important effects from TFP news shocks while Barsky and Sims (2011) show that good
news about TFP in the future generates a recession today due to wealth effects that depress
hours and investment in favor of consumption and leisure. In an estimated RBC model with
real rigidities, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) find that news about wage mark-up, prefer-
ence and government spending predict around half of aggregate fluctuations and dominate TFP
news shocks. Broadly similar conclusions are reported by Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and
4In the restricted model environment the shock acts as an anticipated capital depreciation shock: to avoid a
large fall in future consumption agents respond by building up capital immediately, increasing hours worked in the
production of investment goods and substitute resources out of consumption, smoothing out the negative wealth
shock. Production of investment goods, hours worked and output (as the rise in investment dominates the decline
in consumption) rise immediately. Thus, the resulting dynamics fail to resemble the typical business cycle pattern
of co-movement.
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Fujiwara et al. (2011) in estimated New Keynesian DSGE models, though the share of fluctu-
ations explained by news shocks is noticeably smaller. Recently, Christiano et al. (2010) and
Christiano et al. (2012) estimate a DSGE model and identify news shocks arising in the risk-
iness of the entrepreneurial sector as a major source of fluctuations. Like ours, these authors
point to news that propagate and can be identified, having distinct implications about financial
prices and quantities, through the financial sector. Our findings similarly suggest a signifi-
cant role for news shocks lies within propagation channels that are tightly linked with financial
intermediation.5 6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some stylized facts
on sectoral co-movement in U.S. data. Section 3 describes the model economy. Section 4 de-
scribes the estimation methodology, data and discusses estimation results. Section 5 quantifies
the importance of different structural shocks as driving forces behind aggregate fluctuations.
Section 6 discusses the propagation of asset value news shocks while Section 7 compares them
with financial market indicators. Section 8 evaluates the model’s fit in relation to competing
specifications. Section 9 concludes.
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Figure 1: Total hours (black, dashed), consumption sector hours (blue, dotted) and investment sector
hours (red, solid) (per capita average weekly hours times employees). Left panel: HP1600 detrended
series. Right panel: Demeaned series in levels. Dark grey bars show NBER dated recessions. See
the Data Appendix B for a description of the sectoral hours series.
2 Evidence on sectoral co-movement
Sectoral co-movement of inputs and outputs is a pervasive stylized fact of business cycles. Table
2 presents some basic facts; it reports cross correlations of HP de-trended sectoral hours worked
and sectoral investment (only available at an annual frequency) with real GDP. All sectoral
5A related channel is emphasized in Gunn and Johri (2011) who in the context of a calibrated model investigate
the role of news in the efficiency and innovation of intermediation in the financial system. This type of news is
shown to be able to generate boom-bust cycles in liquidity and economic activity.
6Other recent work identifies channels that can give rise to important effects of news, for example,
Beaudry and Portier (2007), Christiano et al. (2008), Karnizova (2010), Gunn and Jorhi (2011), Keiichiro et al.
(2012), Kobayashi and Nutahara (2010), Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009) and Guo (2008).
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Table 1: Peak to trough change of aggregate and sectoral hours in recessions
Total Hours Consumption Sector Investment Sector
1990Q3 – 1991Q1 -0.020 -0.007 -0.029
2001Q1 – 2001Q4 -0.042 -0.020 -0.063
2007Q4 – 2009Q2 -0.097 -0.054 -0.149
Total hours are non-farm business sector in per capita terms. The series for sectoral hours are per
capita non-farm average weekly hours times employees. See the Data Appendix B for a description
of the sectoral hours series.
variables co-move very strongly with real GDP. Sectoral hours worked appear to lag real GDP
by one or two quarters. Investment flows produced for the consumption sector are more strongly
correlated compared to investment flows produced for use in the investment sector. Previous
work has considered multi sector environments. Important contributions in this area include,
but are not limited to, Long and Plosser (1983), Huffman and Wynne (1999), Horvath (1998),
Horvath (2000), Hornstein and Praschnik (1997), Dupor (1999), Ramey and Shapiro (1998).
This early work has focused on RBC frameworks using a variety of assumptions on input–
output linkages. Huffman and Wynne (1999) demonstrated the difficulty of a standard two
sector RBC model with free factor mobility to produce sectoral co-movement in response to
TFP shocks. More recently, researchers have appealed to the richer structure and implications
of multiple sector models to address a variety of questions. Boldrin et al. (2001) use a two
sector model with limited factor mobility calibrated to the U.S. economy to account for the risk
free rate and equity premium puzzles. Ireland and Schuh (2008), investigate the productivity
performance of the U.S. highlighting technological differences across sectors. Guerrieri et al.
(2010) provide conditions for an accurate interpretation of investment specific shocks using
information from the Input-Output Tables. Foerster et al. (2011) examine quantitatively the
relative importance of aggregate and sector specific shocks in U.S. industrial production.7
Table 2: Cross-Correlation of aggregate and sectoral variables with real GDP
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6
Total Hours -0.174 -0.049 0.129 0.304 0.486 0.685 0.861 0.878 0.816 0.680 0.495 0.308 0.121
Consumption sector hours -0.275 -0.154 0.004 0.168 0.358 0.579 0.801 0.859 0.840 0.749 0.578 0.412 0.236
Investment sector hours -0.210 -0.099 0.062 0.225 0.409 0.616 0.819 0.865 0.821 0.708 0.551 0.389 0.219
Total Investment 0.244 0.027 -0.159 -0.346 -0.310 0.144 0.841 0.636 0.048 -0.301 -0.446 -0.367 -0.097
Consumption sector Investment 0.136 -0.015 -0.114 -0.290 -0.257 0.169 0.842 0.684 0.145 -0.177 -0.337 -0.340 -0.170
Investment sector Investment 0.323 0.072 -0.182 -0.343 -0.311 0.084 0.668 0.449 -0.079 -0.389 -0.487 -0.325 0.011
Total hours are non-farm business sector in per capita terms. The series for sectoral hours are non-farm average weekly hours times
employees expressed in per capita terms. Statistics for hours are calculated from the HP1600 detrended series. Investment series are
annual per capita real investment in private fixed assets. Statistics are calculated from HP100 detrended series. Sample for the hours
series is 1990Q2-2011Q1. Sample for the investment series is 1990-2010. See the Data Appendix B for details.
7Others introduce the multi sector structure to New Keynesian environments (see for example, Edge et al.
(2008), DiCecio (2009), Buakez et al. (2009)).
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3 The Two Sector Model
The sectors in the model produce consumption and investment goods. The latter are long-lived
and are used as capital inputs in each sectors’ production process, while the former are non-
storable and enter only into consumers utility functions. To allocate a sector to the consumption
or investment category, we used the 2005 Input-Output tables. The Input-Output tables track
the flows of goods and services across industries and record the final use of each industry’s
output into three broad categories: consumption, investment and intermediate uses (as well as
net exports and government). First, we determine how much of a 2-digit industry’s final output
goes to consumption as opposed to investment or intermediate uses. Then we adopt the fol-
lowing criterion: if the majority of an industry’s final output is allocated to final consumption
demand it is classified as a consumption sector; otherwise, if the majority of an industry’s out-
put is allocated to investment or intermediate demand, it is classified as an investment sector.
Using this criterion, mining, utilities, transportation and warehousing, information, manufac-
turing, construction and wholesale trade industries are classified as the investment sector and
retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing, professional and business ser-
vices, educational services, health care and social assistance, arts, entertainment, recreation,
accommodation and food services and other services except government are classified as the
consumption sector.8
The model includes eight different types of economic agents: A continuum of households
that consume, save in interest bearing deposits and supply labor on a monopolistically compet-
itive labor market. Employment agencies aggregate different types of labor to a homogenous
aggregate for intermediate goods production. A continuum of intermediate goods firms pro-
duce investment and consumption goods using labor and capital services as inputs. They rent
labor services from the employment agencies and rent capital services on a perfectly compet-
itive market from capital services producers. Final goods producers aggregate intermediate
producers output in each sector. Physical capital producers use a fraction of investment goods
and existing capital to produce new sector specific capital goods. Financial intermediaries col-
lect deposits from households and finance the capital acquisitions of capital services producers.
A monetary policy authority controls the nominal interest rate.
3.1 Intermediate goods producers
3.1.1 Intermediate goods producer’s production and cost minimization
Intermediate goods in the consumption sector are produced by a monopolist according to the
production function,
Ct(i) = max
{
At(LC,t(i))
1−ac(KC,t(i))
ac −AtV
ac
1−ai
t FC ; 0
}
.
Intermediate goods in the investment sector are produced by a monopolist according to the
production function,
It(i) = max
{
Vt(LI,t(i))
1−ai(KI,t(i))
ai − V
1
1−ai
t FI ; 0
}
,
8We have checked whether there is any migration of 2-digit industries across sectors for our sample. The only
industry which changes classification (from consumption to investment) during the sample is “information” which
for the majority of the sample can be classified as investment and we classify it as such.
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where Kx,t(i) and Lx,t(i) denote the amount of capital services and labor services rented by
firm i in sector x = C, I and ac, ai ∈ (0, 1) denote the share of capital in the respective
production function. Fixed costs of production, FC , FI > 0, ensure that profits are zero along
a non-stochastic balanced growth path and allow us to dispense with the entry and exit of
intermediate good producers (Christiano et al. (2005), Rotemberg and Woodford (1995)).9 The
variable At denotes the (non-stationary) level of TFP in the consumption sector and its growth
rate, zt = ln
(
At
At−1
)
, follows the process,
zt = (1− ρz)ga + ρzzt−1 + ε
z
t , (1)
Similarly, Vt is the (non-stationary) level of TFP in the investment sector and its growth rate,
vt = ln
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
follows the process,
vt = (1− ρv)gv + ρvvt−1 + ε
v
t , (2)
Here, εzt and εvt are i.i.d. N(0, σ2z) and N(0, σ2v), respectively. The parameters ga and gv are the
steady state growth rates of the two TFP processes above and ρz, ρv ∈ (0, 1) determine their
persistence.
3.1.2 Intermediate goods producer’s pricing decisions
A constant fraction ξp,x of intermediate firms in sector x = C, I cannot choose their price
optimally in period t but reset their price — as in Calvo (1983) — according to the indexation
rule,
PC,t(i) = PC,t−1(i)π
ιpC
C,t−1π
1−ιpC
C ,
PI,t(i) = PI,t−1(i)π
ιpI
I,t−1π
1−ιpI
I
[( At
At−1
)−1( Vt
Vt−1
) 1−ac
1−ai
]ιpI
,
where πC,t ≡ PC,tPC,t−1 and πI,t ≡
PI,t
PI,t−1
(
At
At−1
)−1(
Vt
Vt−1
) 1−ac
1−ai is gross inflation in the two sec-
tors and πC , πI denote steady state values. The factor that appears in the investment sector
expression adjusts for investment specific progress.
The remaining fraction of firms, (1− ξp,x), in sector x = C, I can adjust the price in period
t. These firms choose their price optimally by maximizing the present discounted value of
future profits. The resulting aggregate price index in the consumption sector is,
PC,t =
[
(1− ξp,C)P˜
1
λC
p,t
C,t + ξp,C
((πC,t−1
π¯t
)ιpC
π
1−ιpC
C PC,t−1
) 1
λC
p,t
]λCp,t
.
The aggregate price index in the investment sector is,
PI,t =
[
(1− ξp,I)P˜
1
λI
p,t
I,t + ξp,I
(
PI,t−1
(πI,t−1
π¯t
)ιpI
π
1−ιpI
I
[( At
At−1
)−1( Vt
Vt−1
) 1−ac
1−ai
]ιpI) 1λI
p,t
]λIp,t
.
9The fixed costs are assumed to grow at the same rate as output in the consumption and investment sector to
ensure that they do not become asymptotically negligible.
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3.2 Final goods producers
Final goods, Ct and It, in the consumption and investment sector respectively, are produced by
perfectly competitive firms combining a continuum—Ct(i) and It(i)—of intermediate goods,
according to the technology,
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
(Ct(i))
1
1+λC
p,t di
]1+λCp,t
, It =
[∫ 1
0
(It(i))
1
1+λI
p,t di
]1+λIp,t
,
The elasticity λxp,t is the time varying price markup over marginal cost for intermediate firms.
It is assumed to follow the exogenous stochastic process,
log(1 + λxp,t) = (1− ρλxp ) log(1 + λ
x
p) + ρλxp log(1 + λ
x
p,t−1) + ε
x
p,t,
where ρλxp ∈ (0, 1) and εxp,t is i.i.d. N(0, σ2λxp), with x = C, I . Shocks to λ
x
p,t can be interpreted
as mark-up (or cost-push) shocks.
Profit maximization and the zero profit condition for final good firms imply that sectoral
prices of the final goods, PC,t and PI,t, are CES aggregates of the prices of intermediate goods
in the respective sector, PC,t(i) and PI,t(i),
PC,t =
[∫ 1
0
PC,t(i)
1
λC
p,t di
]λCp,t
, PI,t =
[∫ 1
0
PI,t(i)
1
λI
p,t di
]λIp,t
.
3.3 Households
3.3.1 Household’s utility and budget constraint
Households consist of two types of members, workers and bankers. At any point in time,
there is a fraction 1 − f that are workers and f that are bankers. The workers supply (spe-
cialized) labor and earn wages while the bankers manage a financial intermediary. Both mem-
ber types return their respective earnings back to the household. This set-up is identical to
Gertler and Karadi (2011) except for the fact that workers have monopoly power in setting
wages. The household maximize the utility function,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtbt
[
ln(Ct − hCt−1)− ϕ
(LC,t(j) + LI,t(j))
1+ν
1 + ν
]
, β ∈ (0, 1), ϕ > 0, ν > 0,
(3)
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator, β is the discount factor and h is the degree of
(external) habit formation. The inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity is denoted by ν while ϕ
is a free parameter which allows to calibrate total labor supply in the steady state to be unity.
Due to the non-stationarity of technological (TFP) progress, utility is logarithmic to ensure the
existence of a balanced growth path. Consumption is not indexed by (j) because the existence
of state contingent securities ensures that in equilibrium, consumption and asset holdings are
the same for all households. The variable bt is a intertemporal preference shock, which affects
both the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility of labor. It is assumed to
follow the stochastic process,
log bt = ρb log bt−1 + ε
b
t , (4)
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where ρb ∈ (0, 1) and εbt is i.i.d N(0, σ2b ).
The household’s flow budget constraint (in consumption units) is,
Ct +
Bt
PC,t
≤
Wt(j)
PC,t
(LC,t(j) + LI,t(j)) + Rt−1
Bt−1
PC,t
−
Tt
PC,t
+
Ψt(j)
PC,t
+
Πt
PC,t
, (5)
whereBt is holdings of bank deposits (which are risk free and equivalent to government bonds),
Ψt is the net cash flow from household’s portfolio of state contingent securities, Tt is lump-sum
taxes, Rt the (gross) nominal interest rate paid on deposits and Πt is the net (after a start-up
fund given to new bankers’ members of household) per-capita profit accruing to households
from ownership of all firms (financial and non-financial). Notice above the wage rate, Wt, is
identical across sectors due to perfect labor mobility.
3.3.2 Employment agencies
Each household j ∈ [0, 1] supplies specialized labor, Lt(j), monopolistically as in Erceg et al.
(2000). A large number of competitive “employment agencies” aggregate this specialized labor
into a homogenous labor input which is sold to intermediate goods producers in a competitive
market. Aggregation is done according to the following function,
Lt =
[∫ 1
0
Lt(j)
1
1+λw,t dj
]1+λw,t
.
The desired markup of wages over the household’s marginal rate of substitution (or wage mark-
up), λw,t, follows the exogenous stochastic process,
log(1 + λw,t) = (1− ρw) log(1 + λw) + ρw log(1 + λw,t−1) + εw,t,
where ρw ∈ (0, 1) and εw,t is i.i.d. N(0, σ2λw).
Profit maximization by the perfectly competitive employment agencies implies the labor
demand function,
Lt(j) =
(Wt(j)
Wt
)− 1+λw,t
λw,t
Lt, (6)
where Wt(j) is the wage received from employment agencies by the supplier of labor of type
j, while the wage paid by intermediate firms for the homogenous labor input is,
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
1
λw,t dj
]λw,t
.
3.3.3 Household’s wage setting
Following Erceg et al. (2000), in each period, a fraction ξw of the households cannot freely
adjust its wage but follows the indexation rule,
Wt+1(j) = Wt(j)
(
πc,te
zt+
ac
1−ai
vt
)ιw(
πce
ga+
ac
1−ai
gv
)1−ιw
.
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The remaining fraction of households, (1− ξw), chooses an optimal wage, Wt(j), by maximiz-
ing,10
Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξswβ
s
[
− bt+sϕ
Lt+s(j)
1+ν
1 + ν
+ Λt+sWt(j)Lt+s(j)
]}
,
subject to the labor demand function (6). The aggregate wage evolves according to,
Wt =
{
(1− ξw)(W˜t)
1
λw + ξw
[(
πce
ga+
ac
1−ai
gv
)1−ιw(
πc,t−1e
zt−1+
ac
1−ai
vt−1
)ιw
Wt−1
] 1
λw
}λw
,
where W˜t is the optimally chosen wage.
3.4 Capital services producers
There is a perfectly competitive sector with capital services producers that transform physical
capital to effective capital. At the end of period t capital services producers in sector x = C, I ,
purchase physical capital K¯C,t or K¯I,t from physical capital producers (described in the next
section) in the respective sector at price QC,t or QI,t. At the beginning of the next period,
capital services producers set the utilization rate of capital. The utilization rate, ux,t, transforms
physical capital into effective capital according to
Kx,t = ux,tξ
K
x,tK¯x,t−1, x = C, I,
Capital services producers incur costs when setting utilization, which are denoted by ax(ux,t)
per unit of capital. This function has the properties that in the steady state u = 1, ax(1) = 0 and
χx ≡
a′′x(1)
a′x(1)
, where "′"s denote differentiation. Capital services producers rent effective capital
in perfectly competitive markets to intermediate goods produces and earn a rental rate equal to
RKx,t/PC,t per unit of capital.
In transforming physical into effective capital we allow for a capital quality shock (as in
Gertler and Karadi (2011)), ξKx,t, and assume it evolves according to
log ξKx,t = ρξK ,x log ξ
K
x,t−1 + ε
ξK
x,t , x = C, I,
where ρξK ,x ∈ (0, 1). Because this disturbance (as shown below) directly affects the value
of capital—equivalently value of assets held by intermediaries since they provide finance for
capital acquisitions—we call it an asset value shock.11
We introduce a richer information structure with respect to this process. Specifically, we
assume the innovation of the shock process consists of two components,
εξ
K
x,t = ε
ξK,0
x,t + ε
ξK,news
x,t , x = C, I, (7)
10All households that can reoptimize will choose the same wage. The probability to be able to adjust the wage,
(1 − ξw), can be seen as a reduced-form representation of wage rigidities with a broader microfoundation; for
example quadratic adjustment costs (Calvo (1983)), information frictions (Mankiw, N. Gregory and Reis, Ricardo
(2002), Sims (2003)) and contract costs (Caplin and Leahy (1997)).
11Recently this type of exogenous variation to the value of capital has enjoyed increasing popularity in
macroeconomic models. Other studies that include this type of shock include for example Gourio (2012),
Sannikov and Brunnermeier (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler et al. (2011).
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where the first component, εξ
K,0
x,t , is unanticipated and the second component, ε
ξK,news
x,t , is antici-
pated or news. For example, Alexopoulos (2011) and Ramey (2011) document, using a variety
of sources from US data, people receive information (or news) in advance of the actual real-
ization of technology and government spending innovations.12 News can be anticipated several
quarters ahead so that,
εξ
K,news
x,t ≡
H∑
h=1
εξ
K,h
x,t−h,
where εξ
K,h
x,t−h is advanced information (or news) received by agents in period t − h about the
innovation that affects asset values in period t. H is the maximum horizon over which agents
can receive advance information (anticipation horizon). It is assumed that the anticipated and
unanticipated components for sector x = C, I and horizon h = 0, 1, . . . , H are i.i.d. with
N(0, σ2
ξK,h,x
) and uncorrelated across sector, horizon and time. Note the process above also
allows for revisions in expectations. In other words, information received t − h periods in
advance can later be revised by updated information received at t − h + 1, ...t − 1 or by the
unanticipated component, εξ
K,0
x,t . This implies news received at any anticipation horizon may
only be partially (or fail to) materialize. To clarify this information structure, suppose we
consider a one-quarter ahead news horizon so H = 1 and εξ
K
x,t = ε
ξK,0
x,t + ε
ξK,1
x,t−1. Now in period
t rational agents can form expectations about one period ahead asset value shock process as
follows,
log ξKx,t = ρξK ,x log ξ
K
x,t−1 + ε
ξK,0
x,t + ε
ξK,1
x,t−1
log ξKx,t+1 = ρξK ,x log ξ
K
x,t + ε
ξK,0
x,t+1 + ε
ξK,1
x,t
log ξKx,t+1 = ρξK ,x
(
ρξK ,x log ξ
K
x,t−1 + ε
ξK,0
x,t + ε
ξK,1
x,t−1
)
+ εξ
K,0
x,t+1 + ε
ξK,1
x,t
Et
[
log ξKx,t+1
]
= ρ2ξK ,x log ξ
K
x,t−1 + ρξK ,xε
ξK,0
x,t + ρξK ,xε
ξK,1
x,t−1 + ε
ξK,1
x,t . (8)
Capital services producers in period t + 1 in sector x = C, I choose the utilization rate of
capital as follows,
max
ux,t+1
[
RKx,t+1
PC,t+1
ux,t+1ξ
K
x,t+1K¯x,t − ax(ux,t+1)ξ
K
x,t+1K¯x,tAt+1V
ac−1
1−ai
t+1
]
.
The resulting first order conditions are,
rKx,t+1 = a
′
x(ux,t+1), with rKx,t+1 =
RKx,t+1
PC,t+1
V
1−ac
1−ai
t+1 A
−1
t+1.
Further, they purchase physical capital at the end of period t at price Qx,t and sell the
un-depreciated component at the end of period t + 1 at price Qx,t+1 to the physical capital
producers. Hence, total receipts of capital services producers in period t + 1 are equal to,
RKx,t+1
PC,t+1
ux,t+1ξ
K
x,t+1K¯x,t − ax(ux,t+1)ξ
K
x,t+1K¯x,tAt+1V
ac−1
1−ai
t+1 + (1− δx)Qx,t+1ξ
K
x,t+1K¯x,t,
12News shocks are introduced in a similar way for example in Davis (2007), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012),
Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Fujiwara et al. (2011).
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which can be expressed as,
RBx,t+1Qx,tK¯x,t (9)
with
RBx,t+1 =
RKx,t+1
Px,t+1
ξKx,t+1ux,t+1 +Qx,t+1ξ
K
x,t+1(1− δx)− ax(ux,t+1)ξ
K
x,t+1At+1V
ac−1
1−ai
t+1
Qx,t
, x = C, I,
(10)
where RBx,t+1 is the rate of return on capital. Since the latter finance their purchase of capital at
the end of each period with funds from financial intermediaries (to be described below), RBx,t+1
is also the stochastic return earned by financial intermediaries in sector x = C, I . Note that
the asset value shock process, ξKx,t+1 directly affects the return to capital suggesting the news
component of the process may potentially affect this return.
3.5 Physical capital producers
Capital producers in sector x = C, I use a fraction of investment goods from final goods pro-
ducers and undepreciated capital stock from capital services producers (as described above) to
produce new capital goods, subject to investment adjustment costs as proposed by Christiano et al.
(2005). These new capital goods are then sold in perfectly competitive capital goods markets
to capital services producers. The technology available for physical capital production is given
as,
O′x,t = Ox,t +
(
1− S
( Ix,t
Ix,t−1
))
Ix,t,
where Ox,t denotes the amount of used capital at the end of period t, O′x,t the new capital
available for use at the beginning of period t+1. The investment adjustment cost function S(·)
satisfies the following: S(1) = S ′(1) = 0 and S ′′(1) = κ > 0, where "′"s denote differentiation.
The optimization problem of capital producers in sector x = C, I is given as,
max
Ix,t,Ox,t
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtΛt
{
Qx,t
[
Ox,t +
(
1− S
( Ix,t
Ix,t−1
))
Ix,t
]
−Qx,tOx,t −
PI,t
PC,t
Ix,t
}
,
where Qx,t denotes the price of capital (i.e. the value of installed capital in consumption units).
The first order condition for investment goods is,
PI,t
PC,t
=Qx,t
[
1− S
( Ix,t
Ix,t−1
)
− S ′
( Ix,t
Ix,t−1
) Ix,t
Ix,t−1
]
+ βEtQx,t+1
Λt+1
Λt
[
S ′
(Ix,t+1
Ix,t
)(Ix,t+1
Ix,t
)2]
.
From the capital producer’s problem it is evident that any value of Ox,t is profit maximizing.
Let δx ∈ (0, 1) denote the depreciation rate of capital and K¯x,t−1 the capital stock available at
the beginning of period t in sector x = C, I . Then setting Ox,t = (1− δ)ξKx,tK¯x,t−1 implies the
available capital stock in sector x, evolves according to,
K¯x,t = (1− δx)ξ
K
x,tK¯x,t−1 +
(
1− S
( Ix,t
Ix,t−1
))
Ix,t, x = C, I, (11)
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Sector specific capital implies that installed capital is immobile between the two sectors; only
newly produced capital can be re-allocated. Our assumption of sector specific capital is mo-
tivated by evidence in Ramey and Shapiro (2001) who report significant costs of reallocat-
ing capital across sectors. Recent two sector models with sector specific capital include,
among others, Boldrin et al. (2001), Ireland and Schuh (2008), Huffman and Wynne (1999)
and Papanikolaou (2011). Limited factor mobility is shown to be able to correct many coun-
terfactual predictions of one sector models with respect to both aggregate quantities and asset
returns. For example, Boldrin et al. (2001) show it can rationalize the equity premium puzzle,
co-movement of sectoral inputs over the business cycle, the inverted leading indicator property
of interest rates.
3.6 Financial sector
3.6.1 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries use deposits from households and their own equity capital and lend
funds to capital services producers. Intermediaries face an exogenous i.i.d. probability of exit
in each period. Because we work with a two sector model we assume banking is segmented;
there are two continua of banks which provide specialized lending to capital services producers
in each sector. In other words, we assume there are specialized intermediaries for financing
each sector. This set-up can also be interpreted as one intermediary with two independent
branches where the probability of lending specialization is equal across sectors and independent
across time. The implementation of financial intermediaries in our two sector model is based
on the framework developed in Gertler and Karadi (2011) in a standard one sector model, so
we only briefly describe it here (Appendix C provides all the equations).13 The balance sheet
of an intermediary that lends in sector x = C, I is,
Qx,tSx,t = Nx,t +
Bx,t
PC,t
, x = C, I,
where Sx,t denotes the quantity of financial claims on capital services producers held by the
intermediary and Qx,t denotes the price per unit of claim. The variable Nx,t denotes equity
capital (or wealth) at the end of period t and Bx,t are households deposits.
Financial intermediaries are limited from infinitely borrowing funds from households by
a moral hazard/costly enforcement problem. Bankers, at the beginning of each period, can
choose to divert a fraction λB of available funds and transfer it back to the household they
belong. Depositors can force the bank into bankruptcy and recover a fraction 1− λB of assets.
Note that the fraction, λB , which bankers can divert is the same across sectors to guarantee that
the household is indifferent of deposit allocation.
Financial intermediaries maximize expected terminal wealth, i.e. the discounted sum of fu-
ture equity capital. The moral hazard/costly enforcement problem constraints the bank’s ability
to acquire assets and hence lending because it introduces an endogenous leverage constraint.
13It is important to highlight that banks in either sector are symmetric. Their performance and hence the
evolution of equity capital differs between them because the demand for capital differs across sectors resulting
in sector specific prices of capital, Qx,t, and rates of return for capital. Moreover the institutional setup of banks
does not depend on firm-specific factors allowing the emergence of a representative bank in each sector.
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In this case, the quantity of assets which the intermediary can acquire depends on the equity
capital, Nx,t, as well as the intermediary’s leverage ratio, ̺x,t. The leverage ratio (bank’s in-
termediated assets to equity) is a function of the marginal gains of expanding assets (holding
equity constant), expanding equity (holding assets constant), and the gain from diverting assets.
Formally,
Qx,tSx,t = ̺x,tNx,t, (12)
Financial intermediaries which exit the industry can be replaced by new ones. Therefore,
total wealth of financial intermediaries is the sum of the equity capital of existing, N ex,t, and
new ones, Nnx,t,
Nx,t = N
e
x,t +N
n
x,t.
The fraction θB of bankers at t− 1 which survive until t is equal across sectors. Then, the law
of motion for the equity capital of existing bankers in sector x = C, I is given by,
N ex,t =θB [(R
B
x,t − Rt−1)̺x,t−1 +Rt−1]Nx,t−1, 0 < θB < 1. (13)
where, RBx,t − Rt−1 denotes the ex-post excess return on assets and RBx,t is the return to capital
given by equation (10). The impact of the latter on N ex,t is increasing in the leverage ratio.
New entering banks receive startup funds from households equal to a small fraction, ̟, of
the value of assets held by the existing banks in their final operating period. Given that the
exit probability is i.i.d., the value of assets held by the existing bankers in their final operating
period is given by (1− θB)Qx,tSx,t. Therefore, new intermediaries begin with,
Nnx,t = ̟Qx,tSx,t, 0 < ̟ < 1. (14)
Combining (13) and (14) leads to the law of motion for total equity capital,
Nx,t =
(
θB [(R
B
x,t − Rt−1)̺x,t−1 +Rt−1]Nx,t−1 +̟Qx,tSx,t
)
ςx,t,
where ςx,t is a shock to the bank’s equity capital, assumed to evolve as,
log ςx,t = ρςx log ςx,t−1 + ǫ
ς
x,t, x = C, I
where ρςx ∈ (0, 1) and ǫςx,t is i.i.d N(0, σ2ςx).
It is useful to define the finance (or risk) premium on assets earned by banks in sector x = C, I ,
as,
R∆x,t = R
B
x,t+1 − Rt. (15)
Financing capital acquisitions by capital services producers. Capital services producers
in sector x, acquire physical capital K¯x,t at the end of period t, and sell the capital on the open
market again at the end of period t+1. This acquisition of capital is financed by intermediaries
in the respective sector. To acquire the funds to buy capital, capital services producers issue
SC,t or SI,t claims equal to the number of units of physical capital acquired, K¯C,t or K¯I,t. They
price each claim at the price of a unit of capital QC,t or QI,t. Then by arbitrage the following
constraint holds,
Qx,tK¯x,t = Qx,tSx,t,
14
where the left-hand side stands for the value of physical capital acquired and the right-hand
side denotes the value of claims against this capital. In contrast to the relationship between
households and banks which is characterized by the moral hazard/costly enforcement problem,
we assume—in line with Gertler and Karadi (2011)—there are no frictions in the process of
intermediation between non-financial firms and banks. Notice the assumptions above imply fi-
nancial intermediaries carry all the risk when lending to capital services producers—effectively
capital services producers earn zero return. Using the assumptions in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
we can interpret these claims as one period state-contingent bonds which allows interpreting
the risk premium defined in equation (15) as a corporate bond spread.
3.7 Monetary policy
The nominal interest rate Rt set by the monetary authority follows a feedback rule,
Rt
R
=
(Rt−1
R
)ρR[(πc,t
πc
)φπ( πc,t
πc,t−1
)φ∆π( Yt
Yt−1
)φ∆Y ]1−ρR
ηmp,t, ρR, φπ, φ∆π, φ∆Y ∈ (0, 1),
where R is the steady state (gross) nominal interest rate and (Yt/Yt−1) is the gross growth rate
in real GDP. The interest rate responds to deviations of consumption sector inflation from its
target level, inflation growth and real GDP growth and is subject to a monetary policy IID shock
ηmp,t.
3.8 Market clearing
The resource constraint in the consumption sector is,
Ct + (a(uC,t)ξ
K
C,tK¯C,t−1 + a(uI,t)ξ
K
I,tK¯I,t−1)
AtV
ac
1−ai
t
V
1
1−ai
t
= AtL
1−ac
c,t K
ac
c,t − AtV
ac
1−ai
t FC .
The resource constraint in the investment sector is,
[
I−ρI,t + I
−ρ
C,t
]− 1
ρ
= VtL
1−ai
I,t K
ai
I,t − V
1
1−ai
t FI .
Notice in specifying the resource constraint in the investment sector we—following Huffman and Wynne
(1999)—allow (but not require) for the realistic possibility that investment goods may be sector
specific to some degree, i.e. imperfect substitutes in production. In other words, investment
goods produced for the investment sector may not be converted (without cost) to use in the con-
sumption sector. There are many examples that can fit this description. For example equipment
produced for use in the automobile industry cannot be immediately or costlessly converted in
equipment for use in services industries.14 As shown by Huffman and Wynne (1999) this fea-
ture helps with sectoral co-movement in a two sector RBC model. The parameter that captures
the elasticity of substitution is given by, −1 ≤ ρ < −∞. For ρ = −1, we obtain a standard
resource constraint for the investment sector (i.e. perfectly substitutable investment goods),
14Huffman and Wynne (1999) motivate this assumption by stating: “...it is trivial to observe that factories cannot
immediately be refurbished so as to produce computers instead of pipelines, or trucks instead of cement. It takes
time and resources to change the composition of goods produced.”
15
while ρ < −1, implies a cost for quickly changing the composition of investment goods across
sectors. We estimate this parameter and thus let the data speak on its magnitude. Moreover,
Lt = LI,t + LC,t, It =
[
I−ρI,t + I
−ρ
C,t
]− 1
ρ
.
Output (GDP in consumption units) is defined as,
Yt = Ct +
PI,t
PC,t
It + et.
where et denotes GDP measurement error. We assume that this measurement error in GDP
evolves according to,
log et = (1− ρe) log e+ ρe log et−1 + ε
e
t ,
where ρe ∈ (0, 1) and εet is i.i.d. N(0, σ2e). The measurement error is used to capture un-
modelled output movements. These can arise from government spending or net exports which
we abstract from in the model, motivated by recent evidence that assigns a relatively un-
important role of government spending shocks as a driving force of the business cycle. For
example, Justiniano et al. (2010) report that government spending shocks account for about 2%
in the variance of many macroeconomic aggregates, such as output, consumption and hours in
business cycle frequencies.
4 Data and Methodology
We estimate the model using quarterly U.S. data (1990 Q2 - 2011 Q1) on eleven macroeco-
nomic and financial market variables. Specifically, we use data on output, consumption, in-
vestment, wages, consumption and investment sector inflation, hours worked, nominal interest
rate. Moreover we include non-financial corporate bond spreads and a measure of interme-
diaries’ equity capital. We construct and use only sector specific spreads for corporate bonds
issued by non-financial companies that are actively traded in the secondary market.15 Appendix
B describes the data sources and methods in detail. The vector of observables we use in the
estimation is given as,
Yt =
[
∆ log Yt,∆ logCt,∆ log It,∆ logWt, πC,t, πI,t, logLt, Rt, R
∆
C,t, R
∆
I,t,∆ logNt
]
. (16)
where ∆ denotes the first-difference operator and we demean the data prior to estimation. In
the vector above, Yt, Ct, It,Wt, πC,t, πI,t, Lt, Rt, R∆C,t, R∆I,t, Nt, denote, output, consumption,
investment, real wage, consumption sector inflation, investment sector inflation, hours worked,
nominal interest rate, consumption sector bond spread, investment sector bond spread and bank
equity respectively.
15This information is provided by Datastream. In line with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) we only consider
bonds with a rating above investment grade and maturity longer than one and shorter than 30 years. We also
exclude all credit spreads below 10 and above 5000 basis points to ensure that the time series are not driven by a
small number of extreme observations. To generate the credit spread series for the consumption/investment sector,
we aggregate the spreads of 1213/4163 bonds and take the arithmetic average. The limited availability of credit
spread data for the 1980s is a factor that restricts the sample for the estimation.
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We use the Bayesian methodology to estimate the model parameters. This methodology is
now extensively used in estimating DSGE models (see Schorfheide (2000), Smets and Wouters
(2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Levin et al. (2005) and Del Negro et al. (2007) for ex-
amples). Recent overviews are presented in An and Schorfheide (2007) and ?. The posterior
distribution of parameters is evaluated numerically using the random walk Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm. We simulate the posterior using a sample of 500,000 draws and use this (after drop-
ping the first 20% of the draws) to (i) report the mean, and the 10 and 90 percentiles of the
posterior distribution of the estimated parameters and (ii) evaluate the marginal likelihood of
the model. We also perform a test of (local) parameter identifiability as proposed by Iskrev
(2010). This test evaluates the Jacobian of the vector containing all parameters (including the
parameters describing the exogenous processes) which determine the first two moments of the
data. When evaluated at the posterior mean of our parameter estimates this Jacobian matrix has
full column rank—equal to the number of parameters to be estimated. This implies that any
chosen vector of parameters around our estimates will give rise to an auto-covariance function
that is different than that implied by our estimates. The test therefore suggests all parameters
are identifiable in a neighbourhood of our estimates.16
Prior distributions. A number of parameters is held fixed during estimation. These are
shown in Table 3.17 For the remaining parameters we use prior distributions that conform to
the assumptions used in Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano et al. (2010), Justiniano et al.
(2011), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012). The first five columns in Table 4 list the parameters and
the assumptions on the prior distributions.
A new parameter we estimate is ρ which determines the degree of intratemporal investment
adjustment cost. This parameter was originally introduced in Huffman and Wynne (1999) and
has been shown to be important, in the context of a calibrated two sector RBC model, in gen-
erating sectoral co-movement in response to sector specific TFP shocks. We estimate a trans-
formation of this parameter, given by ρ∗ = 1 + 1
ρ
that lies in the (0,1) interval and assume has
a Beta distribution.
In the benchmark model we consider four and eight quarter ahead asset value news. This
choice is guided by the desire to economise on the state space and consequently on parameters
16All estimations are done using DYNARE, http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/. We calculate convergence
diagnostics in order to check and ensure the stability of the posterior distributions of parameters as described in
Brooks and Gelman (1998).
17We set the quarterly depreciation rate to be equal across sectors, δC = δI = 0.025. From the steady state
restriction β = πC/R, we set β = 0.9974. The shares of capital in the production functions, aC and aI , are
assumed equal across sectors and fixed at 0.36. The steady state values for the ratio of nominal investment to
consumption is calibrated to be consistent with the average value in the data. The steady state sectoral inflation
rates are set to the sample averages and the sectoral steady state mark-ups are assumed to be equal to 10%. We
also calibrate the steady state (deterministic) growth of TFP in the consumption/investment sectors in line with
the sample average growth rates of output in the two sectors. This yields ga = 0.1% and gv = 0.4% per quarter.
There are three parameters specific to financial intermediation. The parameter θB , which determines the banker’s
average life span does not have a direct empirical counterpart and is fixed at 0.96, very similar to the value used by
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). This value implies an average survival time of bankers
of slightly over six years. The parameters ̟ and λB are fixed at values which guarantee that the steady state risk
premium (the average of spreads across the two sectors) and the steady state leverage ratio matches their empirical
counterparts. The average of the consumption sector and investment sector credit spreads are each equal to 50
basis points in the sample. The average leverage ratio in the data is computed from the ratio of assets (excluding
loans to consumers, real estate and holdings of government bonds) to equity for all U.S. insured commercial banks
and is equal to 5.47. This value is considerably smaller compared to the ratio of total assets to equity, which is
equal to 11.52 (see Appendix B for a detailed description).
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to be estimated while being flexible enough such that the news process is able to accommodate
revisions in expectations. In section 8 we show this choice to be supported by the model fit
criterion though we also discuss denser information structures. Similar news horizons are con-
sidered by Christiano et al. (2010), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) and Khan and Tsoukalas
(2012). Finally, all standard deviations of the contemporaneous and news shocks are assumed
to be distributed as an inverse Gamma distribution with a standard deviation of 2.0. Its im-
portant to note we specify priors for the news components of asset value shocks such that the
sum of the variance of the news components equal the variance of the respective unanticipated
component. This choice is partly guided by the findings of Beaudry and Portier (2006) and
Beaudry and Lucke (2010) who estimate that news shocks (TFP) account for around 50% of
macroeconomic fluctuations. In fact our choice implies that “a-priori“ news shocks are rela-
tively unimportant in explaining the variation in the set of observables. Therefore, shocks of
this type are handicapped in relation to more conventional shocks before the model is taken to
the data. Table 9 reports a variance decomposition computed at the prior means of parameters
which illustrates this fact: the combined contribution of news shocks does not exceed 4% in the
variance of any of the main macroeconomic aggregates and where shocks to TFP processes,
wage mark-up and sectoral price mark-ups dominate.
Table 3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
δC 0.025 Consumption sector capital depreciation
δI 0.025 Investment sector capital depreciation
ac 0.36 Consumption sector share of capital
aI 0.36 Investment sector share of capital
β 0.9974 Discount factor
πC 0.6722 Steady state consumption sector inflation
πI 0.0245 Steady state investment sector inflation
λp 0.1 Steady state price markup (both sectors)
λw 0.1 Steady state wage markup
ga 0.001 Consumption sector sample average TFP growth
gv 0.004 Investment sector sample average TFP growth
pi
i
c
0.399 Steady state investment to consumption ratio
θB 0.96 Probability of bankers survival
̟ 0.00089 Share of assets to new bankers
λB 0.3 Fraction of funds bankers can divert
̺ 5.47 Steady state leverage ratio
RB −R 0.005 Steady state risk premium (per quarter)
Posterior distributions. Table 4 reports the posterior mean and the 10% and 90% inter-
vals of estimated parameters. Overall, the estimates are broadly consistent with earlier stud-
ies using one sector models, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and
Justiniano et al. (2010).
The degree of price stickiness is estimated to be similar in the two sectors, though prices in
the consumption sector are slightly stickier compared to the investment sector. The estimates
of the Calvo parameters imply an average contract length in the investment sector of about
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4.3 quarters, while on average contracts are renegotiated every 5.5 quarters in the consump-
tion sector. There is scattered evidence in the DSGE literature about sectoral price stickiness.
Using a different estimation methodology and sample, DiCecio (2009) finds that prices in the
consumption sector are more flexible than estimated here. The Calvo parameter for wage stick-
iness is very close to the estimates in Smets and Wouters (2007), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012)
and Justiniano et al. (2010), implying that on average wages are renegotiated approximately
every 3 quarters. The estimate for the (intertemporal) investment adjustment cost parameter
(2.18) is broadly similar to Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) (2.08) or Justiniano et al. (2010) (2.85)
estimated using one sector models. The transformed parameter that captures intratemporal
investment adjustment costs is estimated at 0.358. This maps into a value of ρ = −1.55,
suggesting a mild degree of intratemporal adjustment costs in changing the composition of sec-
toral investment flows. As far as we are aware this is the first estimate based on a DSGE model
reported in the literature.
The monetary policy rule parameter estimates as well as the estimates for the persistence
parameters and standard deviations of the unanticipated shocks are in line with the values re-
ported in Smets and Wouters (2007), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Justiniano et al. (2010).
Relative to earlier work on estimated DSGE models we estimate two new shocks that are
financial in nature. First, a shock to the equity capital of intermediaries. The posterior estimates
for the volatility of equity shocks suggest a considerable rightward shift from the prior mean
and the estimates for the AR(1) parameters suggest considerable persistence for the consump-
tion sector equity capital shock. Second, a shock that affects the value of assets of intermedi-
aries in sector x = C, I . The asset value shock consists of unanticipated and anticipated (news)
components. The standard deviations for the news components (consumption sector) are es-
timated to be around or above their unanticipated components suggesting the former may be
important in accounting for the variation in the data. In general the processes for the asset value
shocks in the consumption sector are estimated to be considerably more persistent compared to
their counterparts in the investment sector. Similarly, the volatilities in the news components
of the former are estimated to be larger compared to their counterparts in the investment sector.
We now turn to examine the importance of shocks in accounting for fluctuations.
5 Variance Decompositions
In this section we evaluate the relative contribution and importance of various disturbances
in accounting for fluctuations in the data. We discuss results from a decomposition at the
frequency domain, focussing on business cycle frequencies. We also report an unconditional
decomposition in Appendix A.4 (Table10).
Frequency domain. Table 5 reports a variance decomposition based on the spectral density
of the level of the observables at business cycle frequencies focusing on periodic components
that encompass cycles between 6 and 32 quarters. Asset value news shocks (consumption sec-
tor) account for 30.5%, 22.4%, 31.0% of the variance in output, investment and hours worked
respectively, with news arriving two years ahead being the dominant component. Financial
shocks (i.e. equity and asset value shocks combined) account for 36.1%, 28.1%, 35.1% of the
variance in the same set of variables.
TFP shocks are also of considerable importance at business cycle frequencies. Sectoral TFP
shocks together account for 19.7%, 11.2%, 31.5%, 12.8% of the variance in output, consump-
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Table 4: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Parameter Description Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Distribution Mean Std. dev. Mean 10% 90%
h Consumption habit Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6864 0.6184 0.7550
ν Inverse labour supply elasticity Gamma 2.00 0.75 1.0112 0.2691 1.7312
ξw Wage Calvo probability Beta 0.66 0.10 0.6536 0.5853 0.7227
ξC C-sector price Calvo probability Beta 0.66 0.10 0.8188 0.7537 0.8830
ξI I-sector price Calvo probability Beta 0.66 0.10 0.7744 0.6663 0.8727
ιw Wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2608 0.1400 0.3802
ιpC C-sector price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2360 0.0992 0.3694
ιpI I-sector price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2689 0.1026 0.4235
χI I-sector utilization Gamma 5.00 1.00 5.0041 3.3870 6.6031
χC C-sector utilization Gamma 5.00 1.00 4.0646 2.4370 5.6471
κ Investment adjustment cost Gamma 4.00 1.00 2.1795 1.5915 2.7923
φπ Taylor rule inflation Normal 1.70 0.30 2.2351 1.8988 2.5653
ρR Taylor rule inertia Beta 0.60 0.20 0.9036 0.8815 0.9269
φ∆π Taylor rule inflation growth Normal 0.25 0.10 0.1813 0.0314 0.3195
φ∆Y Taylor rule GDP growth Normal 0.125 0.05 0.2476 0.1636 0.3294
ρ∗ Intratemporal investment adjustmet cost Beta 0.50 0.20 0.3578 0.1468 0.5834
Shocks:
Persistence
ρz C-sector TFP Beta 0.40 0.20 0.1483 0.0148 0.2750
ρv I-sector TFP Beta 0.40 0.20 0.2585 0.1289 0.3838
ρb Preference Beta 0.60 0.20 0.8225 0.7588 0.8867
ρe GDP measurement error Beta 0.60 0.20 0.9741 0.9508 0.9985
ρλCp
C-sector price markup Beta 0.60 0.20 0.2266 0.0670 0.3786
ρλIp
I-sector price markup Beta 0.60 0.20 0.8034 0.6907 0.9269
ρλw Wage markup Beta 0.60 0.20 0.3246 0.1583 0.4917
ρςC C-sector equity capital Beta 0.60 0.20 0.8047 0.7609 0.8501
ρςI I-sector equity capital Beta 0.60 0.20 0.6070 0.4092 0.8002
ρξK ,C C-sector asset value Beta 0.60 0.20 0.9142 0.8719 0.9570
ρξK ,I I-sector asset value Beta 0.60 0.20 0.1943 0.0767 0.3050
Shocks:
Volatilities
σz C-sector TFP Inv Gamma 0.50 2.0 0.2691 0.1628 0.3744
σv I-sector TFP Inv Gamma 0.50 2.0 1.4572 1.2343 1.6774
σb Preference Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 2.0948 1.3957 2.7869
σe GDP measurement error Inv Gamma 0.50 2.0 0.4310 0.3649 0.4934
σmp Monetary policy Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.1293 0.1114 0.1473
σλCp
C-sector price markup Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.2797 0.2298 0.3290
σλIp
I-sector price markup Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.2120 0.1547 0.2686
σλw Wage markup Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.3268 0.2582 0.3944
σςC C-sector equity capital Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.2744 0.2225 0.3245
σςI I-sector equity capital Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.1772 0.1105 0.2436
σξK ,C C-sector asset value Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.0558 0.0250 0.0863
σξK,4,C C-sector asset value 4Q ahead Inv Gamma 0.1/
√
2 2.0 0.0521 0.0186 0.0889
σξK,8,C C-sector asset value 8Q ahead Inv Gamma 0.1/
√
2 2.0 0.1709 0.0951 0.2459
σξK ,I I-sector asset value Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 2.6620 2.1124 3.2142
σξK,4,I I-sector asset value 4Q ahead Inv Gamma 0.1/
√
2 2.0 0.0632 0.0165 0.1229
σξK,8,I I-sector asset value 8Q ahead Inv Gamma 0.1/
√
2 2.0 0.0548 0.0175 0.1004
The parameter that captures the intratemporal adj. cost for investment, is a transformation of the original parameter, ρ,
according to, ρ∗ = 1 + 1
ρ
.
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tion, investment and hours worked respectively. Interestingly, TFP shocks of the investment
specific type (i.e. TFP shocks in the investment sector) account for the bulk of the variance
shares above (except consumption). Specifically, they account for 14.1%, 30.8% and 12.2%
of the variance in output, investment and hours worked respectively. The importance of TFP
shocks of the investment specific type stands in contrast to findings in earlier studies (e.g.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012), Christiano et al. (2010)) that find shocks of this type are neg-
ligible sources of fluctuations but more in line with the findings in Justiniano et al. (2010) and
Fisher (2006) who report a large share of fluctuations to be accounted for by investment spe-
cific shocks. The reason for these apparently contradicting findings is that the former studies,
identify investment specific shocks from variation in the relative price of investment alone in
one sector estimated DSGE models. This restriction sharply limits the quantitative significance
of these shocks as they have to match point-by-point in the sample the time series properties of
the relative price of investment. But in our two sector model this restriction is not necessarily
valid and hence other shocks can also affect the relative price of investment, leaving more room
for investment specific shocks to affect model dynamics in the short run. To conserve space we
present a more detailed explanation for this finding in Appendix A.2.
The preference shock accounts for about 42.5% in the variance of consumption. This is line
with Justiniano et al. (2010) who also report evidence for the otherwise irrelevant preference
shock in accounting for consumption fluctuations. The price mark-up shock in the investment
sector accounts for a sizeable fraction in the variance of investment and hours worked, approxi-
mately 34% of the forecast error variance in each of these variables. Both price mark up shocks
explain a large fraction of variation in the sectoral inflation rates along with the investment
sector TFP which accounts for 22.0% in the variance of that sector’s inflation. The wage mark-
up shock primarily explains a large share of the variance in real wage (56.5%) and to a much
smaller extent variance in hours worked (8.5%).
Turning to financial variables, the main driving forces for the variance in consumption sec-
tor corporate bond spread are asset value news and equity capital shocks (consumption sector).
The eight quarter ahead news component and the equity capital shock, account for 39.3% and
32.7% in its variance, respectively. Thus a sizeable fraction of the variance in the consumption
sector spread can be accounted for by news shocks, suggesting a significant amount of advance
information present in the corporate bond spread series. By contrast only a small fraction of
the variation in the investment sector spread is accounted for by news shocks. The investment
sector TFP, monetary policy, consumption sector mark-up and investment sector equity shocks
each approximately account for 20.0% in the variance of that series. Finally, news components
account for about 23.0% in the nominal interest rate. This suggests monetary policy may be
responding to advance signals relating to the quality of banking sector balance sheets, perhaps
due to the imminent lending contraction that accompanies a decline in the valuation of assets.
The importance of news shocks. Why do asset value news shocks become so important in
accounting for the variation in the data in the presence of multiple sources of disturbances? This
type of news shock is distinct from other, more conventional, shocks included in the estimation
that may also affect the value of assets, e.g. TFP shocks. Importantly, relative to these other
disturbances, it generates the right type of co-movements between aggregate quantities, prices
and intermediaries’ equity capital (see section 6 for an exposition of the transmission). More
specifically it generates, (a) procyclical movements in quantities, (b) countercyclical move-
ments in credit spreads, (c) inverted lead indicator property (with respect to output) of the
short term nominal rate—the fact that in the data the nominal rate is positively correlated with
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past and negatively correlated with future output growth)—and (d) the lead-lag relationship be-
tween equity capital growth on the one hand with output growth and investment growth on the
other, namely the fact that equity growth is positively correlated with future output and invest-
ment growth. An illustration of the facts above can be confirmed by examining Figure 2. The
Figure presents dynamic correlations among several key variables pertaining to facts (a)-(d)
above, in the data (solid line), model with all shocks (line with ’+’), model with the dominant
2 year ahead news shock only (line with circles). The dynamic correlations generated by the
news only driven model (all the other shocks set at zero) are very similar to the correlations
generated by the model with all shocks active. At the same time the news driven model also
generates correlations broadly similar with the dynamic correlations in the data. These find-
ings combined explain why the news shock becomes important in accounting for fluctuations
in aggregate quantities and prices.
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Table 5: Variance decomposition at posterior estimates—business cycle frequencies (6-32 quarters)
Financial Shocks
z v b e ηem λ
C
p λ
I
p λw ςC ςI ξ
K,0
C ξ
K,0
I ξ
K,4
C ξ
K,8
C ξ
K,4
I ξ
K,8
I
Output 0.055 0.141 0.013 0.034 0.080 0.015 0.214 0.085 0.018 0.000 0.017 0.021 0.015 0.290 0.000 0.000
[0.044 0.066] [0.125 0.162] [0.010 0.018] [0.029 0.039] [0.070 0.089] [0.011 0.019] [0.164 0.267] [0.062 0.108] [0.015 0.022] [0.000 0.000] [0.013 0.023] [0.017 0.025] [0.011 0.021] [0.249 0.329] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
Consumption 0.106 0.006 0.425 0.001 0.135 0.075 0.020 0.146 0.003 0.000 0.014 0.010 0.006 0.053 0.000 0.000
[0.088 0.125] [0.004 0.009] [0.384 0.456] [0.000 0.001] [0.117 0.153] [0.059 0.092] [0.013 0.032] [0.113 0.179] [0.002 0.003] [0.000 0.000] [0.011 0.018] [0.009 0.012] [0.004 0.008] [0.044 0.064] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
Total Investment 0.007 0.308 0.012 0.000 0.018 0.001 0.344 0.025 0.013 0.000 0.009 0.036 0.010 0.214 0.000 0.000
[0.005 0.008] [0.274 0.346] [0.009 0.016] [0.000 0.000] [0.016 0.020] [0.001 0.002] [0.281 0.412] [0.018 0.033] [0.010 0.016] [0.000 0.000] [0.007 0.012] [0.028 0.045] [0.007 0.014] [0.178 0.244] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
Total Hours 0.006 0.122 0.013 0.001 0.072 0.007 0.344 0.085 0.014 0.000 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.295 0.000 0.000
[0.005 0.008] [0.107 0.142] [0.009 0.019] [0.001 0.001] [0.062 0.081] [0.004 0.009] [0.280 0.410] [0.062 0.111] [0.011 0.017] [0.000 0.000] [0.009 0.016] [0.013 0.017] [0.011 0.020] [0.245 0.333] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
Real Wage 0.068 0.086 0.014 0.000 0.017 0.134 0.054 0.565 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.039 0.000 0.000
[0.056 0.085] [0.075 0.098] [0.008 0.021] [0.000 0.000] [0.012 0.023] [0.113 0.166] [0.039 0.071] [0.513 0.610] [0.001 0.002] [0.000 0.000] [0.005 0.010] [0.006 0.008] [0.003 0.005] [0.029 0.049] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
Nom. Interest Rate 0.001 0.094 0.100 0.001 0.234 0.188 0.085 0.051 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.223 0.000 0.000
[0.001 0.002] [0.085 0.105] [0.082 0.117] [0.001 0.002] [0.206 0.257] [0.154 0.221] [0.060 0.117] [0.037 0.062] [0.002 0.004] [0.000 0.000] [0.003 0.005] [0.008 0.011] [0.005 0.010] [0.190 0.255] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
C-Sector Inflation 0.004 0.099 0.115 0.000 0.120 0.368 0.038 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.135 0.000 0.000
[0.004 0.006] [0.089 0.112] [0.095 0.137] [0.000 0.001] [0.106 0.136] [0.310 0.421] [0.025 0.055] [0.084 0.134] [0.000 0.001] [0.000 0.000] [0.001 0.001] [0.003 0.005] [0.002 0.005] [0.109 0.159] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
I-Sector Inflation 0.001 0.220 0.005 0.001 0.075 0.001 0.203 0.016 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.115 0.013 0.326 0.000 0.000
[0.001 0.002] [0.199 0.246] [0.004 0.006] [0.001 0.001] [0.066 0.084] [0.001 0.002] [0.164 0.250] [0.013 0.019] [0.007 0.011] [0.000 0.000] [0.008 0.014] [0.101 0.132] [0.009 0.018] [0.281 0.371] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
C-Sector Spread 0.005 0.033 0.008 0.000 0.022 0.042 0.106 0.004 0.327 0.000 0.016 0.025 0.016 0.393 0.000 0.000
[0.004 0.007] [0.028 0.038] [0.006 0.010] [0.000 0.000] [0.019 0.026] [0.033 0.051] [0.078 0.141] [0.003 0.006] [0.293 0.367] [0.000 0.000] [0.012 0.020] [0.021 0.030] [0.012 0.023] [0.346 0.434] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
I-Sector Spread 0.019 0.187 0.033 0.001 0.191 0.179 0.097 0.025 0.009 0.206 0.000 0.026 0.001 0.023 0.000 0.000
[0.015 0.022] [0.165 0.215] [0.026 0.040] [0.001 0.001] [0.169 0.213] [0.147 0.212] [0.060 0.151] [0.019 0.030] [0.007 0.011] [0.161 0.257] [0.000 0.000] [0.020 0.033] [0.001 0.001] [0.017 0.031] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.001]
Equity 0.066 0.211 0.013 0.001 0.090 0.078 0.042 0.008 0.074 0.001 0.027 0.077 0.014 0.294 0.000 0.000
[0.055 0.077] [0.189 0.235] [0.010 0.018] [0.001 0.001] [0.080 0.100] [0.062 0.095] [0.029 0.059] [0.005 0.011] [0.064 0.087] [0.001 0.001] [0.021 0.034] [0.070 0.088] [0.011 0.020] [0.252 0.338] [0.000 0.000] [0.000 0.000]
Median shares are reported with values in brackets 5 and 95 percentiles. z = TFP in consumption sector, v = TFP in investment sector, b = Preference shock, e = GDP measurement error, ηem = Monetary policy, λCp = Consumption sector price markup, λIp = Investment sector price markup, λw = Wage markup, ςC = Consumption
sector equity capital, ςI = Investment sector equity capital, ξK,0C = Unanticipated consumption sector asset value, ξ
K,x
C = x quarter ahead consumption sector asset value news, ξ
K,0
I = Unanticipated investment sector asset value, ξ
K,x
I = x quarters ahead investment sector asset value news. Business cycle frequencies considered in the
decomposition correspond to periodic components with cycles between 6 and 32 quarters. The decomposition is performed using the spectrum of the DSGE model and an inverse first difference filter to reconstruct the levels for output, consumption, total investment, the real wage and equity. The spectral density is computed from
the state space representation of the model with 500 bins for frequencies covering the range of periodicities.
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Figure 2: Dynamic correlations among several key variables in the data (solid line), implied by
the baseline model with all shocks (blue line with ’+’) and the model with the eight quarter ahead
consumption sector asset value news shock only (red line with circles).
Our quantitative results are similar with findings reported in Gilchrist et al. (2009) and
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), studies that exploit information from corporate bond spreads
but obtained using different methodologies. Gilchrist et al. (2009) report that credit market
shocks identified through corporate credit spreads in a factor based VAR, explain around 30% of
the variation in economic activity (measured from industrial production). Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012), decompose the movements in credit spreads to variation in default risk and excess bond
premium with the latter shown to be tightly associated with the quality of balance sheets of key
financial intermediaries. They find variation in the excess bond premium can explain around
10% and 25% of output and investment variation respectively, quite similar to the variance
shares in the same variables accounted for by news shocks. In section 7 we show that our
estimated news shocks are strongly correlated with both market measures of default risk and
the excess bond premium which explains the similarities in the findings above. Our quantita-
tive results also bear similarities with findings reported in Christiano et al. (2010) who identify
news shocks (in riskiness about entrepreneurial activity) in a one sector DSGE model with
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Bernanke et al. (1999) style financial frictions to be a significant source of U.S. fluctuations.
We undertake an additional exercise to better appreciate the role of financial and in partic-
ular asset value news shocks in explaining the in-sample variation in the data. Figure 3, shows
the actual sample path of output growth, investment growth, total hours worked and sectoral
credit spreads along with simulation paths generated by the model when either, (a) only all fi-
nancial shocks or, (b) only all asset value news shocks are turned on and all other shocks are set
equal to zero. A first visual inspection of Figure 3 illustrates that both simulation paths track
movements of the actual data quite closely. A noteworthy finding is that the path generated
with news shocks only correctly captures most of the turning points in actual output growth
and also quite successfully account for the 2001 and 2008 recessions (though not very well
the 1990s recession). Interestingly, the extent of the decline in output growth during the 2008
recession can be entirely captured by the simulation path generated by news shocks. Impor-
tantly, the news shocks simulation path tracks quite well the behavior of total hours worked.
The simulated path captures the rise after the 1990s recession, and the significant declines in
the 2001 and the 2008 recessions. The simulation path with financial shocks (fourth row, left
panel) closely tracks the actual path of the consumption sector spread. The path with news
shocks only (right panel), correctly predicts the rise of spreads in the 2001 and 2008 recession,
but misses the 1990s recession. The path with financial shocks (fifth row), captures to some
extent the investment sector spread sample path though not very successfully. The reason for
this limited success of financial shocks is that investment specific TFP shocks account for a
large share of the variance in this spread.
Figure 4 presents the sample paths of (actual) sectoral hours worked along with the simula-
tion paths described above. Note, that sectoral hours worked have not been used as observables
in the estimation, hence even a simulation with all shocks active would not be able to perfectly
fit the actual sample paths. An interesting observation is the success of the simulation path
generated by news shocks in tracking the observed investment sector hours series despite the
fact we have only used information from total hours. This simulation path accounts for the
decline in the 1990s as well as the prolonged decline well after the end of that recession. It
can also account quite successfully for the decline in the 2001 recession and the continued
weakness in the aftermath of the recession—though it predicts a much stronger recovery than
that experienced in the mid part of the 2000s. Finally, it accounts for the significant decline in
investment sector hours in the 2008 recession. The simulation paths however do not track well
the actual path of consumption sector hours. Essentially these simulation paths miss the robust
growth in consumption sector hours for much of the 1990s and until the 2001 recession, though
they better capture the movements in this series in the second half of the sample. Additional
information about the model’s fit on the labor market dimension is provided in Appendix A.4
(Table 11).
In summary, the variance decompositions reveal an important role for (consumption sector)
asset value news shocks, suggesting they are one of the main driving forces behind fluctuations
in the majority of real macro and financial variables. We now turn to describe how these shocks
propagate in the model.
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Figure 3: Data (solid line) and counterfactual simulation (thin line) with all financial shocks only
(left) or news shocks only (right). From top to bottom row: Output growth, investment growth,
total hours, consumption sector credit spread, investment sector credit spread. Dark grey bars show
NBER dated recessions.
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Figure 4: Data (solid line) and counterfactual simulation (thin line) with all financial shocks only
(left) or news shocks only (right). From top to bottom row: consumption sector hours, investment
sector hours. Dark grey bars show NBER dated recessions
6 The Propagation of Asset Value News Shocks
The variance decompositions above suggest news shocks are important in accounting for the
dynamics of the data. In this section, we discuss the model’s responses to this type of shock
through a series of impulse response functions (IRFs) in order to shed light on the reasons for
their important role in accounting for fluctuations.
News Shocks. Figure 5 shows the responses to an anticipated (two year ahead) decline in the
value of (consumption sector) assets held by the financial sector.18 The value of assets decline
on impact upon arrival of bad news (C-sector price of capital). This initial decline in the value of
assets leads to de-leveraging by the financial sector: banks use equity capital to cover losses on
assets held (to satisfy their balance sheet constraint), while at the same time reducing demand
for new assets. The initial depressing effect on the value of assets can be readily illustrated
with the expression that defines the return to capital in the consumption sector, equation (10)
re-arranged to yield,
QC,t =
RK
C,t+1
PC,t+1
ξKC,t+1uC,t+1 +QC,t+1ξ
K
C,t+1(1− δC)− a(uC,t+1)ξ
K
C,t+1At+1V
ac−1
1−ai
t+1
RBC,t+1
.
Given the forward looking behavior of QC,t the equation above shows that news about the
future path of ξKC,t, affects the value of capital today. Banks deleverage relatively quickly:
while leverage initially rises due to the big impact of the decline in equity capital, it falls below
the steady state within eight quarters as equity capital losses slow down. Notice, when the
18All shocks in this section are set to produce a downturn.
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shock actually materializes banks hold considerably less assets relative to equity capital so
their leverage ratio is smaller than what they begun with. In this sense, banks prepare for the
anticipated decline in asset values ahead of time with a significant reduction in asset demand
and lending (C-sector financial claims). Credit spread in the consumption sector rise (C-sector
spread) in anticipation of the deterioration in asset values, consistent with its countercyclical
behavior in the data. The shock spills over to the investment sector through lower demand for
capital goods from this sector. Lower demand for consumption sector assets by intermediaries
leads to a reduction in the demand for capital (by capital services producers from physical
producers) which in turn leads to an overall reduction in the production of investment goods,
including investment goods produced for the investment sector. The reduction in investment
demand leads to a lower volume of financing for investment sector capital goods (I-sector
financial claims) and consequently lower valuation of these assets (I-sector price of capital).
The interesting aspect of the IRFs, especially in relation to hours worked, is the prediction
of a relatively strong decline in investment sector in relation to consumption sector hours. In
addition, the behavior of total hours mirrors the behavior of investment sector hours. Thus
the model is able to successfully replicate the sectoral facts about hours worked discussed in
the introduction. Its important to note that the bulk of the adverse effects experienced by the
investment sector are due to the real sectoral link between the two sectors, i.e. the reduction
in demand for capital goods from the consumption sector sets off a recession in the investment
sector. 19
The anticipation of the decline in the value of assets also triggers a negative wealth effect
that reduces consumption. The negative effect on consumption and investment (as explained
above) leads to a strong initial decline in output before the shock materializes. One noteworthy
aspect of the adjustment to the value news disturbance is the fact that the contractionary phase is
quite long and recovery is slow. The combination of news and subsequent realization lead to a
deeper and longer recession phase. The arrival of bad news itself generate significant declines
in macroeconomic aggregates. However, the actual realization of the innovation sets off an
extended phase of reduced financing, depressed asset values and economic activity. Figure
5 shows that lending declines further at the time when the shock materializes and remains
depressed for an extended period of time.
All macroeconomic aggregates exhibit co-movement in response to the news shock: out-
put, consumption, investment and hours worked immediately decline in response to bad news.
Importantly, the IRFs illustrate that this type of news shock can generate the pattern of sectoral
co-movement that is a distinctive feature of the business cycle. Both sectoral hours and sectoral
investment rates experience a decline in response to the unfavorable news shock.
Inspecting the mechanism. The discussion of the IRFs above illustrates that news shocks
generate the broad based aggregate and sectoral comovement typically observed during a busi-
ness cycle. In this section we investigate in more detail the reasons why news shocks turn out
to be producing dynamics that resemble the business cycle. Specifically, in Figure 6 we com-
pare the IRFs from a model with and a model without a financial intermediation channel. In
both sets of IRFs we use identical parameter values as estimated in Table 4 and we show the
responses to an eight quarter ahead news shock.
19In order to isolate this real sectoral link channel we undertake an experiment where we shut off the financial
intermediation in the investment sector while keeping it active in the consumption sector. Figure 9 in Appendix
A.3 shows the IRFs.
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Figure 5: Responses to a one std. deviation negative asset value news shock (anticipated 8 quarters
ahead) in the consumption sector.
Figure 6 demonstrates that financial intermediation not only strongly amplify the econ-
omy’s response to the news shock, through its impact on the leverage constraint that restricts
the amount of credit flowing to the real economy, but also changes its transmission. The model
without the financial channel cannot generate aggregate or sectoral comovement in response
to the news shock. The shock generates a decline in the value of capital (not shown) as in the
model with the financial channel but contrary to the responses in the latter, output, investment
and total hours worked respond positively to this unfavorable shock. Both sectoral investment
variables rise, while investment sector hours rise and consumption sector hours fall in response
to this shock. The reason for the radically different responses is that in the model without a
financial channel this shock acts as an anticipated negative supply shock, i.e. agents antici-
pate a reduction in the productivity of capital services and depreciation of the capital stock in
the consumption sector. This implies that consumption will have to fall in the future. Agents
attempt to protect from the future deterioration in consumption sector capital now via higher
investment that builds up capital in that sector. Given the sector specific nature of capital (in-
stalled capital cannot move between sectors), investment is the only feasible way to change the
effective quantity of capital across sectors. Thus investment sector output rises. Since labor
moves freely, hours worked can change swiftly across sectors, thus to boost capital production
the household reallocates hours worked from the consumption to the investment sector. Effec-
tively, agents substitute resources out of consumption into the investment sector to smooth out
the future consumption decline.
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Figure 6: Responses to a negative one std. deviation asset value news shock (anticipated 8 quar-
ters ahead) in the consumption sector. Model with (solid line) and without (dashed line) financial
frictions.
7 Relation of asset value news shocks with financial market
indicators
The exercise above indicates that the financial intermediation channel is key for the ability of
the news shock to play a quantitatively important role in accounting for aggregate fluctuations.
While not directly comparable (the timing is different since it is anticipated), it acts simi-
lar to a depreciation shock as in Gourio (2012) in terms of quantities and risk premia, though
a standard preference specification like ours implies countercyclical consumption behavior in
Gurio. We have introduced this disturbance as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) who dub it broadly
as a capital quality shock. As shown above, the shock directly affects the value of capital and
consequently value of assets in intermediaries balance sheets. But what factors reflect news
about capital quality and consequently news about asset values? Installed capital may rapidly
lose value during recessions if, for example, capital is good or firm-specific and existing prod-
ucts get obsolete during these periods—in line with the evidence in Bernard et al. (2010) who
show there is substantial cyclical product creation and destruction in the U.S. manufacturing
sector. This may be anticipated by investors in corporate bond markets and Philippon (2009)
argues the latter are likely to be more informative for the pricing of installed capital, compared
to the stock market.20
Recently attention has been given to the role financial intermediaries play in the determina-
tion of asset prices. Evidence reported in Adrian et al. (2010), emphasize that losses in balance
sheets of key financial intermediaries (e.g. securities broker-dealers and shadow banks) affect
20The argument is that bond market prices will reflect the existing firm technology rather than growth options or
equivalently organizational rents from expanding into new areas which are thought to be better reflected in stock
prices.
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a wide spectrum of asset returns and cause in effect risk averse behavior: a reduction in lending
to the corporate sector and increases in risk premia (excess returns). For example, Adrian et al.
(2010) show that negative leverage growth of such intermediaries is associated with higher fu-
ture excess corporate bond returns and lower output growth. Adrian et al. (2010) suggest these
dynamics can be interpreted as the (time-varying) effective risk bearing capacity of the finan-
cial sector, in other words its willingness to bear risk as balance sheets contract or expand. It is
worth noting the financial channel in the model predicts behavior consistent with these findings
above: the leverage constraint in the model implies gloomy asset value news generate losses in
equity capital, reducing leverage and lending to the corporate sector and cause corporate bond
spreads to rise. It would thus be interesting to compare the estimated asset value news process
with a measure that proxies for the effective risk bearing capacity of the financial sector as well
as other available financial market indicators as a way of model validation.
News shocks, expected default and the excess bond premium. We compare the estimated
news shock (eight quarter ahead) series with three financial market indicators. We consider two
indicators of default risk for the U.S. non-financial corporate sector available from Fitch and the
GZ—excess bond premium, estimated by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) from firm-level U.S.
corporate bond spreads. Figure 7 plots from left to right the estimated news shock series with,
(a) Fitch 5-year ahead probability of default of all firms, (b) Fitch 5-year ahead probability of
default of consumption sector firms only and (c) GZ—excess bond premium. The plots begin
in 2001 due to data availability of the expected default series.21 The default probability is a
forward looking measure of default risk, providing advance information of changes in the credit
quality of bond issuing firms, whereas the estimated GZ—excess bond premium series captures
factors emphasized by Adrian et al. (2010) described above, that is, factors that cause variation
in intermediaries’ balance sheets and risk premia and proxy for variation in the effective risk
bearing capacity of the financial sector as a whole.22
The estimated news shock series though noticeably more volatile is strongly correlated with
all three measures. Gloomy news is associated with a rise in expected defaults but also a rise
in the excess bond premium suggesting these phenomena may reflect a common factor. Figure
7 indicates the estimated news process captures the rise in the probability of default both in the
2001 and the 2008 recessions. It begins to signal unfavorable news at the same time when both
probability of default measures and the excess bond premium begin to pick up in the mid 2007.
Note that, prior to the 2008 recession, the probability of default especially for non-financial
consumption sector firms (middle panel), picks up more sharply compared to the all-firm inclu-
sive measure, indicating more serious risks in that sector and this is captured successfully by
the estimated news process. Our estimated news shock also co-moves quite strongly with the
GZ—excess bond premium. This fact should not be surprising since the leverage constraint in
the model creates a feedback loop between intermediaries’ equity capital and asset prices that
21In these plots, a positive value of the the asset news series indicates bad news. To facilitate comparison the
default risk indicator is normalized to have a zero mean and the same standard deviation as the shock series.
The same normalization applies to the other indicators. The Fitch measure includes information from 655 non-
financial US corporations, 222 of which are in the consumption sector. We have also undertaken comparisons with
the 1 year ahead probability of default and found a somewhat weaker correlation suggesting the news shocks we
identify reflect more long term risks.
22Equivalently it captures variation in the price of default risk, i.e. deviations in the pricing of corporate bonds
relative to the default risk of the issuer, or extra compensation (relative to expected default) demanded by investors
for holding corporate bonds.
31
resembles the effective risk capacity dynamics described in Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) and
Adrian et al. (2010).
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Figure 7: Asset value news (8 quarter ahead) shock (thin line) and financial market indicators (thick
line) — Fitch five-year ahead probability of default–all firms (left panel), Fitch five-year ahead prob-
ability of default of companies in the consumption sector (middle panel), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012) excess bond premium (right panel). A positive value for the news shock series indicates
unfavorable news. Light grey areas indicate two standard deviation bands of the shock series. Dark
grey bars show NBER dated recessions.
Asset value news shocks and lending indicators. Given the strong correlation of the news
shock series with the excess bond premium and the tight connection of the latter with lend-
ing behavior, we compare the estimated news shock to the Federal Reserve Board’s Loan
Officer Opinion Survey (LOOS), a qualitative indicator that captures banking sector lending
practices.23
The survey reports the net percent balance of banks reporting that lending standards for
commercial and industrial loans have tightened (number of loan officers reporting tightening
less the number reporting easing divided by the total number); responses account for around
60% of all US bank loans and around 70% of all US business loans. The lending standards
index is a qualitative indicator of credit tightness. In Figure 8, we plot the net balance from
the survey against the (negative) of the 2 year ahed value news shock.24 The news shock series
comoves with the lending standards index over the entire sample. The Figure also shows that
the estimated shocks track the lending standards indicator much better in the second half of the
sample. A notable feature in Figure 8 is the fact that both lending standards and unfavorable
news about asset values rise sharply before and during recessions suggesting a tight connection
during those periods.25
23The LOOS asks senior management from big US banks the following question: Over the past three months,
how have your bank credit standards for approving loan applications for Commercial and Industrial loans or
credit lines–excluding those to finance mergers and acquisitions–changed? 1. Tightened considerably, 2. tight-
ened somewhat, 3. remained basically unchanged, 4. eased somewhat, 5. eased considerably
24A positive value of the shock indicates bad news. To facilitate comparison with the shock series the lending
standards index is normalized to have a zero mean and the same standard deviation as the shock series.
25Interestingly, Lown and Morgan (2006), using a VAR methodology find that innovations to LOOS lend-
ing standards predict contractions in loans and output. Most recently, Gambetti and Musso (2012) using a
time-varying VAR methodology, find loan supply shocks to have a sizeable impact on US GDP, explaining
approximately 20% of its variance, with their estimated contribution particularly important during recessions.
Bassett et al. (2010) identify loan supply shocks using detailed information on the reasons reported by loan of-
ficers for changes in lending standards; they show among the most important ones for changing standards are
perceptions of future economic outlook, suggesting that the LOOS reflects to some degree anticipated macroeco-
nomic fundamentals, and risk tolerance.
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In addition the LOOS survey includes responses for the specific reasons given for changes
in lending standards. These reasons include, ”reduced tolerance for risk”, ”future economic
outlook”, ”degree of competition”, ”industry specific problems”, ”reduced liquidity in the sec-
ondary market for loans” among others. Its interesting to note that our news shock series is
more strongly correlated with the net percent balance of banks reporting ”reduced tolerance
for risk” (both relative to the entire net balance and the remaining reasons cited) as a primary
reason behind tightening in lending standards. This is consistent with the tight association
between the news shock series and the excess bond premium discussed above.
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Figure 8: Asset value news (8 quarter ahead) shock (thin line) and Senior Loan Officer Opinion
Survey on Bank Lending Practices by the Federal Reserve Board (thick line). Light grey areas
indicate two standard deviation confidence bands of the shock series. Dark grey bars show NBER
dated recessions.
8 Robustness
In this section we aim to assess the fit of the benchmark model in relation to plausible alterna-
tives. Specifically we undertake three broad comparisons. We compare the benchmark with, (a)
model without financial intermediation, (b) model without news shocks or, (c) model with news
in either TFP or asset value disturbances or both. Models with TFP news components have been
estimated in Khan and Tsoukalas (2012), Fujiwara et al. (2011) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012) among others, using one sector DSGE frameworks, but the results therein have been
pointing towards a limited quantitative role of TFP news shocks. At the same time it is en-
tirely possible that our richer two sector model and use of several financial sector variables
may yield different conclusions on the role of TFP news shocks. Table 6 reports a compari-
son of different specifications we have considered based on marginal data densities computed
using the modified harmonic mean estimator suggested by Geweke (1999). First, we note the
benchmark model with four and eight quarters ahead asset value news dominates—in terms of
this metric—specifications that include TFP news only (model B and C) or both TFP and asset
value news (model D and E). Further, it dominates model versions with news that arrive more
frequently, i.e. 1,4 and 8 quarter ahead news and also dominates the model with unanticipated
shocks only (model F). Second, we also compare the fit of the benchmark model to a model
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with financial frictions turned off. This latter model version is a two-sector New Keynesian
model with the same nominal and real frictions and shocks as the benchmark. This comparison
is reported in the bottom panel of the Table. To facilitate the comparison we estimate these ver-
sions on a restricted set of data, namely, excluding both corporate bond spreads and equity since
the model without financial frictions makes no predictions for financial variables. The bench-
mark model with financial frictions has a higher marginal data density compared to the model
without financial frictions on the restricted set of observables, highlighting the importance of
financial frictions in fitting the data. Third, we highlight the fact that the presence of financial
variables in the estimation significantly raises the contribution of asset value news shocks in
accounting for the dynamics in the data. When we estimate the model with the restricted set of
data (model version G), the variance shares accounted for by news shocks decline significantly
compared to the benchmark model with the financial series used in estimation. Specifically, in
model version G, news shocks account for approximately 15%, 12%, 19% of the forecast error
variance (business cycle frequencies) in output, investment and hours worked respectively (see
Table 8). These shares are approximately only half of the shares accounted for by news shocks
in the benchmark.
We have considered four additional robustness exercises briefly described here.26 First, we
estimate the benchmark model with the addition of a marginal efficiency of investment (MEI)
shock, motivated by previous work in one sector estimated DSGE models that finds a signifi-
cant share of macroeconomic quantities are driven by shocks of this type (see Justiniano et al.
(2010), Justiniano et al. (2011), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012)). We find the MEI shock to be
irrelevant in accounting for the variation in the data—essentially we obtain a nearly identical
variance decomposition to the benchmark model (without an MEI). For space consideration we
do not report the results from this exercise but we note the model includes an investment sector
TFP shock that can properly capture dynamics induced by an MEI shock. Second, we esti-
mate the benchmark model with the addition of AR(1) measurement errors that we assume are
present in the financial observables, namely the corporate bond spreads and the equity capital
series, potentially accounting for model misspecification in the financial channel of the model.
We assume relatively tight Normal priors such that the measurement error standard deviation
mean values correspond to 10% of the corresponding variables’ standard deviation and assume
Beta distributions with a prior mean of 0.5 for the AR(1) coefficients of measurement errors.
While not reported for brevity, we obtain a slightly reduced contribution of asset value news
shocks though still broadly similar with the benchmark results. Thirdly, we estimate a model
with a correlated news structure, similar to the process for news adopted in Christiano et al.
(2010).27 Correlated news across time has been suggested by Leeper and Walker (2011) as an
alternative way to incorporate advance signals about future innovations that may also help re-
solve co-movement problems. The variance decomposition we obtain from this specification
is broadly similar to the benchmark results, that is news shocks continue to be an important
source of fluctuations. However, we note that the marginal data density from the correlated
news model is significantly smaller compared to the benchmark model by approximately 45
log points. Fourth, in Appendix A.1, we perform a final robustness exercise. Specifically, we
estimate a model that—in addition to sector specific TFP—includes a common aggregate TFP
26The results from these additional exercises are available upon request.
27Specifically we assume a process with eight in total news components, each arriving per quarter for a span of
2 years. We assume a correlation between them that is a function of time and impose a common variance on all
components.
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shock, motivated by, (a) recent work in Foerster et al. (2011) who report common TFP shocks
are quantitatively important in the post 1980s period in accounting for the variability in U.S.
industrial production and (b) a plausible concern that our asset value news shock may be substi-
tuting for an aggregate common TFP that we did not consider during estimation. Similar to the
benchmark model (without a common aggregate TFP shock) results, asset value news shocks
account for a significant and almost identical fraction of the variance shares in the observables
in this alternative model (see Table 7).
Table 6: Log marginal data densities for alternative models
Model Setup Log Marginal
Data Density
Estimated with full data set (including financial variables)
Benchmark 4 and 8 quarter ahead asset value news shocks in both sectors -761.15
Model A: 1, 4 and 8 quarter ahead asset value news shocks in both sectors -763.00
Model B: 4 and 8 quarter ahead TFP news shocks in both sectors -778.00
Model C: 1, 4 and 8 quarter ahead TFP news shocks in both sectors -778.00
Model D: 4 and 8 quarter ahead asset value news shocks and TFP news shocks in both sectors -770.24
Model E: 1, 4 and 8 quarter ahead asset value news shocks and TFP news shocks in both sectors -772.90
Model F: Model without news components -771.74
Estimated with restricted data set (excluding financial variables)
Model G: Benchmark estimated without spread and equity data as observables -532.54
Model H: Model without financial intermediation estimated without spread and equity data as observables -533.70
9 Conclusions
In this paper we used Bayesian techniques to estimate a two-sector DSGE model for the U.S.
economy using a sample from 1990Q2 to 2011Q1 in order to quantitatively explore the interac-
tion between financial markets, news shocks and the real economy. The model we use borrows
elements from earlier RBC multi-sector environments and allows for financial intermediation
constraints of the same type as in Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The
model we consider allows for a variety of disturbances that have been proposed in earlier litera-
ture and introduces two types of financial shocks, namely, equity capital and asset value shocks.
These latter disturbances incorporate components that provide advance information or news to
agents when forming forecasts about the future value of assets. Our paper contributes to the
ongoing debate on the importance of news shocks for aggregate fluctuations and highlights
a new—financial—channel that can give quantitatively important real effects of news shocks
while at the same time makes some headway in addressing sectoral co-movement.
Our results are as follows. First, asset value news shocks explain a sizeable fraction of fluc-
tuations at business cycle frequencies, accounting for 31% of output, 22% of investment and
31% of hours variation. Previous work (see Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), Gourio (2012) ) has examined qualitatively the properties of purely unanticipated
shocks of this type in the context of one sector calibrated models. By considering both unantic-
ipated and news shocks our paper provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first quantitative
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assessment of the magnitude and the relative importance of these different components. Our
estimation method exploits the fact that financial variables (corporate bond spreads and equity
capital) contain substantial information about asset value news shocks. We find the quantita-
tive importance of news shocks—in terms of accounting for the variance shares of real macro
variables reported above—approximately doubles when financial variables are included in the
estimation than if they are not. Consequently, the news component of asset value disturbances
accounts for a significant fraction of the variation in corporate bond spreads and equity capital.
Its interesting to note, the data strongly favors news shocks that only directly affect the value of
assets in the consumption sector—investment sector asset value disturbances are largely irrele-
vant for fluctuations. Instead, the data prefers to use the sectoral links of the model as a natural
propagation mechanism of consumption sector shocks across sectors.
Second, and more importantly this type of financial news shock can generate aggregate
and sectoral co-movement, a pervasive stylized fact of business cycles and can explain the
behavior of total hours worked surprisingly well during recessions. The success in explaining
the behavior of total hours during recessions is linked to the fact these shocks almost entirely
capture the declines in investment sector hours during these periods, in line with the evidence
presented in Figure 1. Moreover, these co-movement properties of news shocks obtain with
a standard preference specification. Instead the financial channel of the model is key for co-
movement and propagation. Gloomy news about asset values generate loses in intermediaries’
equity capital, reductions in lending to the corporate sector and a feedback loop between equity
capital, lending and countercyclical credit spreads, a process that sets off a recession. These
dynamics are very similar to those reported in recent work by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)
and Adrian et al. (2010), based on very different methodologies, suggesting that the model
estimated here captures to a large extent the key links between financial markets and the real
economy present in the data and provides a useful perspective to further study these phenomena.
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10 Appendix
A Additional Results, Tables and Figures
A.1 Model with a Common Aggregate TFP Shock
Foerster et al. (2011) highlight the importance of aggregate TFP shocks in explaining the vari-
ability in aggregate U.S. industrial production. They quantify the relative importance of aggre-
gate and sectoral TFP shocks bridging the literature of multi-sector models with dynamic factor
models and find that in the post 1980 period, aggregate TFP shocks are as important as sectoral
TFP shocks in explaining this variability. Aggregate TFP shocks in principle are better candi-
dates for generating co-movement in different sectors, whereas sector specific shocks require
sectoral links to propagate in the aggregate. Given the emphasis we place on the co-movement
properties of asset value news shocks in this paper and motivated by these recent findings we
subject our findings to a further scrutiny test by incorporating a common aggregate TFP shock
that affects both sectors symmetrically. This shock is a natural candidate in generating co-
movement so its interesting to check whether the importance of news shocks in accounting for
the variance in the data survives in this extended model. We introduce a stationary TFP shock
to the production function of both sectors as follows,
Ct(i) = max
{
ftAt(LC,t(i))
1−ac(KC,t(i))
ac −AtV
ac
1−ai
t FC ; 0
}
.
It(i) = max
{
ftVt(LI,t(i))
1−ai(KI,t(i))
ai − V
1
1−ai
t FI ; 0
}
,
where the TFP shock, ft, follows,
ft = (1− ρf )f + ρfft−1 + ε
f
t , (A.1)
Here, εft is i.i.d. N(0, σ2f ), and the parameter ρf ∈ (0, 1) determines the persistence of the
process.
Table 7 reports the variance decomposition results. Comparing Table 7 with Table 5 indi-
cates the broad similarity in the variance shares accounted for by news shocks. In this extended
model news shocks account for 30.4%, 26.4%, 31.6% in the forecast error variance in out-
put, investment and hours worked at business cycle frequencies, respectively. These shares are
nearly identical to the shares reported from the benchmark model with sector specific shocks
only, with a small increase in the share of variance in investment explained by news in the
model with an aggregate TFP shock. The shares explained by these shocks in the financial
variables are also broadly similar across the two specifications. Carefully comparing the vari-
ance shares, illustrates the reason why the quantitative significance of news shocks remains
broadly unchanged: a large fraction of the variance shares accounted for by consumption sec-
tor TFP in the benchmark model is now explained by the aggregate TFP shock in the extended
model. Both types of shocks generate similar patterns of co-movement: the aggregate TFP by
affecting symmetrically both sectors whereas the consumption sector TFP in the baseline model
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by affecting demand for investment goods from the investment sector in addition to the effects
in the consumption sector, i.e. through sectoral linkages. We conjecture the estimation prefers
to load on the aggregate TFP shock in comparison to the sectoral TFP, because the former does
not need to work as hard as the latter in generating co-movement. However, we note that the
fundamental reason for the robustness of news shocks lies in the fact that the benchmark model
does already allow for several potential sources of co-movement, i.e., in sectoral TFP shocks
(see for example Figures 10 and 11) as well as in other sources such as monetary policy or
price mark-up shocks. We thus conclude that the findings on the importance of news shocks
are robust to the inclusion of an aggregate TFP disturbance.
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Table 7: Variance decomposition at business cycle frequencies — benchmark model with common aggregate TFP shock
Financial Shocks
z v f b e ηem λ
C
p λ
I
p λw ςC ςI ξ
K,0
C ξ
K,0
I ξ
K,4
C ξ
K,8
C ξ
K,4
I ξ
K,8
I
Output 0.022 0.085 0.086 0.016 0.030 0.105 0.035 0.201 0.076 0.015 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.018 0.286 0.000 0.000
Consumption 0.035 0.002 0.104 0.423 0.001 0.142 0.129 0.010 0.098 0.002 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.005 0.035 0.000 0.000
Total Investment 0.004 0.223 0.037 0.014 0.001 0.032 0.001 0.358 0.034 0.014 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.015 0.249 0.000 0.000
Total Hours 0.003 0.083 0.014 0.017 0.001 0.100 0.019 0.329 0.084 0.013 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.018 0.298 0.000 0.000
Real Wage 0.022 0.078 0.046 0.018 0.000 0.032 0.148 0.055 0.530 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.058 0.000 0.000
Nom. Interest Rate 0.000 0.057 0.011 0.072 0.002 0.255 0.320 0.064 0.026 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.175 0.000 0.000
C-Sector Inflation 0.001 0.057 0.037 0.076 0.000 0.085 0.583 0.015 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.077 0.000 0.000
I-Sector Inflation 0.001 0.186 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.098 0.001 0.283 0.015 0.008 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.017 0.361 0.000 0.000
C-Sector Spread 0.004 0.019 0.013 0.010 0.000 0.019 0.065 0.109 0.011 0.349 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.019 0.358 0.000 0.000
I-Sector Spread 0.012 0.105 0.027 0.026 0.001 0.223 0.300 0.034 0.029 0.007 0.213 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.001 0.003
Equity 0.033 0.155 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.130 0.171 0.036 0.004 0.076 0.001 0.039 0.000 0.019 0.313 0.000 0.000
Median shares are reported and values in brackets 5 and 95 percentiles. z = TFP in consumption sector, v = TFP in investment sector, f = common aggregate TFP shock (both sectors), b = Preference shock,
e = GDP measurement error, ηem = Monetary policy, λCp = Consumption sector price markup, λIp = Investment sector price markup, λw = Wage markup, ςC = Consumption sector equity capital, ξ
K,0
C
=
Unanticipated consumption sector asset value, ξK,x
C
= x quarter ahead consumption sector asset value news, ξK,0
I
= Unanticipated investment sector asset value, ξK,x
I
= x quarters ahead investment sector
asset value news. Business cycle frequencies considered in the decomposition correspond to periodic components with cycles between 6 and 32 quarters. The decomposition is performed using the spectrum
of the DSGE model and an inverse first difference filter to reconstruct the levels for output, consumption, total investment, the real wage and equity. The spectral density is computed from the state space
representation of the model with 500 bins for frequencies covering the range of periodicities.
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A.2 Investment Sector TFP Shocks and the Relative Price of Investment
Using the expression for the relative price of investment from the model:
PI,t
PC,t
=
mark upI,t
mark upC,t
1− ac
1− ai
At
Vt
(KI,t
LI,t
)−ai(KC,t
LC,t
)ac
where, ac, ai are capital shares in consumption, and investment sector respectively. Vt, At
is TFP in the investment and consumption sector respectively, and Kx,t
Lx,t
, x = I, C the capital-
labor ratio in sector x. mark upx,t is the mark-up or inverse of the real marginal cost in sector
x. Vt corresponds to the investment specific shock. Notice how the relative price of investment
is driven—at least in the short run—by (a) mark up shocks, (b) sector specific TFP and (c)
differences in capital labor ratios across sectors. The fact that (c) above affects the relative
price of investment implies that all shocks can in principle affect this price. In a special case of
the model with: (i) perfectly competitive product markets, (ii) identical production functions
(factor intensities) in both sectors, (iii) free factor mobility, the expression above becomes,
PI,t
PC,t
=
At
Vt
In this case the model has a one sector representation (e.g. Greenwood et al. (2000)). Fur-
ther, one can readily redefine the investment sector TFP process as Vt = AtV ∗t , where in this
formulation At denotes sector neutral TFP, while V ∗t denotes investment specific TFP. Under
this equivalent formulation the expression above becomes, PI,t
PC,t
= (V ∗t )
−1
, a commonly used
restriction in one sector estimated DSGE models. Thus, under assumptions (i)-(iii), one can
identify the investment specific technology shock from the relative price of investment alone.
But as demonstrated, this tight restriction, is not necessarily valid in a more elaborate two
sector model with an imperfectly competitive investment sector and limited capital mobility
across sectors, like ours. In the more general framework we consider, variation in the relative
price of investment reflects not only investment specific shocks but also (in principle) all other
shocks. Therefore, investment specific shocks in our model, despite the fact that we also in-
clude the relative price of investment in the estimation (through the inclusion of the sectoral
inflation rates) are in principle allowed to affect model dynamics—in a way that is consistent
with volatilities and the spectrum of autocorrelations and cross correlations in the entire set
of observables—-and are not tightly identified through the relative price of investment. From
a quantitative perspective it is interesting to note our results on the importance of investment
sector TFP shocks are more in line with Fisher (2006)), who, using an SVAR methodology
and only a long run restriction linking the relative price with investment specific shocks—thus
allowing for the latter to freely affect dynamics in the short run—has found an important role
of investment specific shocks in accounting for fluctuations in output and hours worked.
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A.3 Additional Impulse Response Functions
Shutting off financial intermediation in the investment sector. Figure 9 shows IRFs from the
benchmark model and compares them with IRFs from a model where financial intermediation
is turned off in the investment sector only. The IRFs from the two models are qualitatively
and quantitatively very similar. The only material difference arises with respect to investment
goods produced for the investment sector; in the benchmark model the decline in production is
more pronounced and it takes longer for investment in that sector to recover.
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Figure 9: Responses to a negative one std. deviation asset value news shock (anticipated 8 quarters
ahead) in the consumption sector. Benchmark model (solid lines) vs. Model without financial
intermediation in the investment sector (dotted lines).
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Sector specific TFP shocks. The two Figures below show IRFs in response to sector
specific TFP shocks.
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Figure 10: Responses to a negative one standard deviation unanticipated TFP shock in the con-
sumption sector.
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Figure 11: Responses to a negative one standard deviation unanticipated TFP shock in the invest-
ment sector.
A.4 Additional Tables
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Table 8: Spectral Variance Decomposition at posterior estimates (excluding financial variables)
Financial Shocks
z v b e ηem λ
C
p λ
I
p λw ςC ςI ξ
K,0
C ξ
K,0
I ξ
K,4
C ξ
K,8
C ξ
K,4
I ξ
K,8
I
Output 0.234 0.184 0.005 0.009 0.078 0.003 0.109 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.066 0.032 0.119 0.000 0.000
Consumption 0.291 0.004 0.440 0.000 0.061 0.012 0.013 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.032 0.005 0.009 0.000 0.000
Total Investment 0.031 0.413 0.028 0.000 0.027 0.001 0.204 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.127 0.021 0.088 0.000 0.000
Total Hours 0.043 0.219 0.011 0.000 0.095 0.001 0.243 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.023 0.038 0.153 0.000 0.000
Real Wage 0.291 0.069 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.117 0.027 0.438 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.000
Nom. Interest Rate 0.030 0.153 0.205 0.000 0.206 0.113 0.069 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.035 0.011 0.071 0.000 0.000
C-Sector Inflation 0.054 0.167 0.219 0.000 0.076 0.203 0.046 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.021 0.007 0.048 0.000 0.000
I-Sector Inflation 0.002 0.259 0.012 0.000 0.059 0.002 0.103 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.383 0.022 0.108 0.000 0.000
C-Sector Spread 0.042 0.141 0.045 0.000 0.028 0.052 0.106 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.114 0.128 0.064 0.274 0.000 0.000
I-Sector Spread 0.025 0.108 0.059 0.000 0.068 0.059 0.167 0.018 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.466 0.004 0.019 0.000 0.000
Equity 0.207 0.195 0.048 0.000 0.056 0.023 0.017 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.226 0.028 0.105 0.000 0.000
Median shares are reported. z = TFP in consumption sector, v = TFP in investment sector, b = Preference shock, e = GDP measurement error, ηem = Monetary policy, λCp = Consumption sector
price markup, λIp = Investment sector price markup, λw = Wage markup, ςC = Consumption sector equity capital, ςI = Investment sector equity capital, ξ
K,0
C
= Unanticipated consumption sector
asset value, ξK,x
C
= x quarter ahead consumption sector asset value news, ξK,0
I
= Unanticipated investment sector asset value, ξK,x
I
= x quarters ahead investment sector asset value news. Business
cycle frequencies considered in the decomposition correspond to periodic components with cycles between 6 and 32 quarters. The decomposition is performed using the spectrum of the DSGE
model and an inverse first difference filter to reconstruct the levels for output, consumption, total investment, the real wage and equity. The spectral density is computed from the state space
representation of the model with 500 bins for frequencies covering the range of periodicities.
48
Table 9: Unconditional Variance Decomposition (computed at Prior Means)
Financial Shocks
z v b e ηem λ
C
p λ
I
p λw ςC ςI ξ
K,0
C ξ
K,0
I ξ
K,4
C ξ
K,8
C ξ
K,4
I ξ
K,8
I
Output Growth 51.69 2.67 0.03 24.87 0.36 2.50 0.06 16.91 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.24 0.10 0.00 0.00
Consumption Growth 69.70 1.89 0.18 0.01 0.91 5.31 0.02 20.52 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.00
Total Investment Growth 37.32 13.10 0.01 0.01 0.56 0.35 2.74 42.92 0.02 0.00 0.70 0.11 1.20 0.90 0.04 0.02
Total Hours 19.89 3.16 0.02 0.00 0.53 1.52 0.53 72.72 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.01 0.65 0.58 0.01 0.01
Real Wage Growth 60.29 4.67 0.00 0.00 0.01 9.27 0.01 25.33 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Inflation 12.85 8.97 0.07 0.03 0.76 38.90 0.12 34.94 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.02 0.84 1.90 0.02 0.03
I-Sector Inflation 7.61 20.69 0.02 0.02 2.52 5.51 35.87 16.58 0.02 0.00 1.51 0.85 3.31 4.76 0.33 0.40
Nom. Interest Rate 8.43 14.54 0.08 0.43 5.26 29.89 0.20 36.21 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.04 1.22 2.85 0.04 0.05
C-Sector Spread 24.83 6.38 0.05 0.52 6.13 38.38 0.64 10.64 2.58 0.00 0.26 0.10 3.04 6.32 0.06 0.06
I-Sector Spread 26.24 4.70 0.07 0.59 6.57 36.98 0.15 16.99 0.00 2.83 0.09 0.12 1.36 2.92 0.17 0.25
Equity Growth 65.87 14.27 0.01 0.02 0.42 3.08 0.01 13.36 0.08 0.01 1.99 0.02 0.59 0.26 0.00 0.00
z = TFP in consumption sector, v = TFP in investment sector, b = Preference shock, e = GDP measurement error, ηem = Monetary policy, λCp = Consumption sector price markup, λIp =
Investment sector price markup, λw = Wage markup, ςC = Consumption sector equity capital, ςI = Investment sector equity capital, ξK,0C = Unanticipated consumption sector asset value,
ξ
K,x
C
= x quarter ahead consumption sector asset value news, ξK,0
I
= Unanticipated investment sector asset value, ξK,x
I
= x quarters ahead investment sector asset value news.
49
Table 10: Unconditional Variance Decomposition at posterior estimates
Financial Shocks
z v b e ηem λ
C
p λ
I
p λw ςC ςI ξ
K,0
C ξ
K,0
I ξ
K,4
C ξ
K,8
C ξ
K,4
I ξ
K,8
I
Output Growth 6.24 13.97 2.33 15.37 9.14 3.39 11.32 7.66 2.48 0.01 2.01 1.20 1.42 23.45 0.00 0.00
Consumption Growth 7.07 6.05 44.40 0.06 13.33 8.17 0.95 8.67 0.11 0.00 1.12 1.69 0.49 7.91 0.00 0.00
Total Investment Growth 0.86 36.91 1.65 0.04 2.49 0.13 26.71 3.34 2.48 0.01 1.30 2.75 1.12 20.21 0.00 0.00
Total Hours 0.61 24.96 1.03 0.07 6.62 0.92 24.56 10.71 0.89 0.00 1.07 2.09 1.10 25.36 0.00 0.00
Real Wage Growth 2.40 8.44 0.47 0.00 0.48 17.94 1.03 66.66 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.29 0.11 1.90 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Inflation 0.26 8.94 6.68 0.04 7.85 60.09 1.41 6.75 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.33 0.19 7.30 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Inflation 0.10 18.57 0.88 0.07 6.60 0.24 28.90 2.32 0.81 0.00 0.94 14.46 0.97 25.13 0.00 0.00
Nom. Interest Rate 0.10 26.46 11.25 0.14 16.19 12.20 4.51 4.77 0.21 0.00 0.71 1.68 0.65 21.13 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Spread 0.78 4.96 0.65 0.01 2.29 3.88 7.35 0.49 34.54 0.00 1.46 3.21 1.41 38.98 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Spread 3.48 31.14 2.41 0.06 15.02 14.09 5.75 2.07 0.62 15.07 0.03 7.84 0.07 2.32 0.01 0.02
Equity Growth 6.87 25.69 2.66 0.08 4.98 3.68 0.52 1.79 10.61 0.08 3.76 7.21 1.83 30.25 0.00 0.00
Median shares are reported. z = TFP in consumption sector, v = TFP in investment sector, b = Preference shock, e = GDP measurement error, ηem = Monetary policy, λCp = Consumption sector
price markup, λIp = Investment sector price markup, λw = Wage markup, ςC = Consumption sector equity capital, ςI = Investment sector equity capital, ξ
K,0
C
= Unanticipated consumption sector
asset value, ξK,x
C
= x quarter ahead consumption sector asset value news, ξK,0
I
= Unanticipated investment sector asset value, ξK,x
I
= x quarters ahead investment sector asset value news.
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Table 11: Cross-Correlations of total and sectoral (model and data) hours with real GDP
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6
Data
Total Hours -0.174 -0.049 0.129 0.304 0.486 0.685 0.861 0.878 0.816 0.680 0.495 0.308 0.121
Consumption sector hours -0.275 -0.154 0.004 0.168 0.358 0.579 0.801 0.859 0.840 0.749 0.578 0.412 0.236
Investment sector hours -0.210 -0.099 0.062 0.225 0.409 0.616 0.819 0.865 0.821 0.708 0.551 0.389 0.219
Model (all shocks activated)
Total Hours -0.174 -0.049 0.129 0.304 0.486 0.685 0.861 0.878 0.816 0.680 0.495 0.308 0.121
Consumption sector hours -0.072 0.075 0.257 0.419 0.582 0.748 0.901 0.857 0.747 0.603 0.423 0.225 0.046
Investment sector hours -0.241 -0.150 0.002 0.166 0.342 0.544 0.717 0.784 0.772 0.660 0.495 0.340 0.170
Model (eight quarter ahead asset value news shock activated)
Total Hours -0.134 0.031 0.199 0.347 0.477 0.583 0.656 0.682 0.672 0.627 0.547 0.429 0.279
Consumption sector hours -0.198 -0.033 0.143 0.298 0.442 0.566 0.659 0.693 0.690 0.651 0.575 0.463 0.317
Investment sector hours -0.119 0.045 0.211 0.357 0.484 0.584 0.653 0.678 0.667 0.620 0.539 0.422 0.269
Data and model time series are HP1600 detrended.
A.5 A Historical Perspective and the 2008 Recession
Given the quantitative importance of news shocks as driving forces behind fluctuations, we
attempt to disentangle the impact of news and unanticipated shocks on the in-sample variation
of GDP and investment growth by performing a historical decomposition. This exercise can
also reveal the importance of shocks during different time periods. Figure 12 depicts the results
of this exercise. It shows the decomposition of output and investment growth into news and all
other shocks.
The decomposition shows that news shocks account for a large fraction of the recessions
in 2001 (2001Q1 - 2001Q4) and 2008 (2007Q4 - 2009Q2). They account for the majority of
the drop in GDP growth and a large share of the decline in investment growth during the 2008
recession. The remaining decline in investment growth (orange bars towards the end of the
recession) is accounted for by unfavorable investment sector TFP shocks. By contrast, news
shocks contribute very little to the downturn of GDP and investment in the early 1990s (1990Q3
- 1991Q1) recession, which according to this exercise is driven by unfavorable investment sec-
tor TFP shocks. This finding is in line with the general assessment of the reasons for these
recessions: while movements in fundamentals are mainly found to be responsible for the re-
cession in the early 1990s (see for example Walsh (1993)), the recent literature on news shocks
entertains the idea that expectation shifts (e.g. due to correction of overoptimistic beliefs about
asset prices) may have played a much bigger role in the last two recessions.
It is apparent from this decomposition that news shocks not only have a strong negative
impact during the aforementioned recessions, but also slow down the subsequent recoveries.
This is especially clear in the aftermath of the 2001 recession where we have a complete set
of observations on the recovery and expansion phase. Unfavorable news continue to arrive
well after the official end of the recession. A similar pattern can be observed after the recent
recession, but in this case a longer sample size would be desirable to be able to draw a more
complete picture. The slow reversion of news shock’s impact on GDP and investment growth
at the trough of the cycle is consistent with a literature that finds agent’s forecast accuracy to
be positively correlated with output.28
28See for example Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) and Görtz and Tsoukalas (2012).
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Figure 12: Historical decomposition of the growth rate of GDP (left) and investment (right) into
value news shocks (yellow) and all other shocks (orange). The grey bars denote NBER dated
recessions.
B Data Sources and Time Series Construction
Table 12 provides an overview of the data used to construct the observables. All the data
transformations we have made in order to construct the dataset used for the estimation of the
model are described in detail below.
Real and nominal variables. Consumption (in current prices) is defined as the sum of per-
sonal consumption expenditures on services and personal consumption expenditures on non-
durable goods. The times series for real consumption is constructed as follows. First, we
compute the shares of services and non-durable goods in total (current price) consumption.
Then, total real consumption growth is obtained as the chained weighted (using the nominal
shares above) growth rate of real services and growth rate of real non-durable goods. Using the
growth rate of real consumption we construct a series for real consumption using 2005 as the
base year. The consumption deflator is calculated as the ratio of nominal over real consump-
tion. Inflation of consumer prices is the growth rate of the consumption deflator. Analogously,
we construct a time series for the investment deflator using series for (current price) personal
consumption expenditures on durable goods and gross private domestic investment and chain
weight to arrive at the real aggregate. The relative price of investment is the ratio of the in-
vestment deflator and the consumption deflator. Real output is GDP expressed in consumption
units by dividing current price GDP with the consumption deflator.
The hourly wage is defined as total compensation per hour. Dividing this series by the
consumption deflator yields the real wage rate. Hours worked is given by hours of all persons
in the non-farm business sector. All series described above as well as the equity capital series
(described below) are expressed in per capita terms using the the series of non-institutional
population, ages 16 and over. The nominal interest rate is the effective federal funds rate.
We use the monthly average per quarter of this series and divide it by four to account for the
quarterly frequency of the model. The time series for hours is in logs. Moreover, all series used
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in estimation (including the financial time series described below) are expressed in deviations
from their sample average.
Financial variables. Data for sectoral credit spreads are not directly available. How-
ever, Reuters’ Datastream provides U.S. credit spreads for companies which we map into the
two sectors using The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).29 A credit
spread is defined as the difference between a company’s corporate bond yield and the yield of
a US Treasury bond with an identical maturity. In constructing credit spreads we only con-
sider non-financial corporations and only bonds traded in the secondary market. In line with
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) we make the following adjustments to the credit spread data we
construct: using ratings from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, we exclude all bonds which
are below investment grade as well as the bonds for which ratings are unavailable. We fur-
ther exclude all spreads with a maturity below one and above 30 years and exclude all credit
spreads below 10 and above 5000 basis points to ensure that the time series are not driven
by a small number of extreme observations. The series for the sectoral credit spreads are
constructed by taking the average over all spreads available in a certain quarter. These two
series are transformed from basis points into percent and divided by four to guarantee that they
are consistent with the quarterly frequency of our model. After these adjustments the dataset
(1990Q2-2011Q1) contains 5376 spreads of bonds of which 1213 are classified to be issued by
companies in the consumption sector and 4163 issued by companies in the investment sector.
This is equivalent to 36425 observations in the consumption and 116628 observations in the
investment sector over the entire sample. The average maturity is 30 quarters (consumption
sector) and 28 quarters (investment sector) with an average rating for both sectoral bond issues
between BBB+ and A-. The total number of firms in our sample is equal to 1696, with 516
firms belonging to the consumption sector and 1180 firms belonging to the investment sector.
The correlation between the two sectoral spread series is equal to 0.83.
Sectoral Hours. Disaggregated data on hours worked that is fully consistent with the con-
cept of our series for aggregate hours (hours of all persons, non-farm business sector) are not
available. To construct series for sectoral hours worked we use the product of all employees
and average weekly hours of production and non-supervisory workers at the 2-digit level. This
data is aggregated for the consumption and investment sector by using 2005 NAICS codes.
The 2-digit industries are allocated to the consumption and investment sector according to the
sectoral definitions derived from the 2005 Input-Output tables outlined in Section 3, and is
consistent with the allocation used for the sectoral bond spreads.
Steady state financial parameters. The steady state leverage ratio of financial interme-
diaries in the model, used to pin down the parameters ̟ and λB , is calculated by taking the
sample average of the inverse of total equity over adjusted assets of all insured US commercial
banks available from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. The same body
reports a series of equity over total assets. We multiply this ratio with total assets in order to
get total equity for the U.S. banking sector that we use in estimation. Total assets includes con-
sumer loans and holdings of government bonds which we want to exclude from total assets to
29We use the 2005 NAICS codes. The investment sector is defined to consist of companies in mining, utilities,
transportation and warehousing, information, manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade industries (NAICS
codes 21 22 23 31 32 33 42 48 49 51 (except 491)). The consumption sector consists of companies in retail trade,
finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing, professional and business services, educational services, health
care and social assistance,arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services and other services
except government (NAICS codes 6 7 11 44 45 52 53 54 55 56 81).
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be consistent with the model concept. Thus, to arrive at an estimate for adjusted assets we sub-
tract consumer, real estate loans and holdings of government and government guaranteed bonds
(such as government sponsored institutions) from total assets of all insured U.S. commercial
banks.
Table 12: Time Series used to construct the observables and steady state relationships
Time Series Description Units Code Source
Gross domestic product CP, SA, billion $ GDP BEA
Gross Private Domestic Investment CP, SA, billion $ GPDI BEA
Real Gross Private Domestic Investment CVM, SA, billion $ GPDIC1 BEA
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods CP, SA, billion $ PCDG BEA
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods CVM, SA, billion $ PCDGCC96 BEA
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services CP, SA, billion $ PCESV BEA
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services CVM, SA, billion $ PCESVC96 BEA
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods CP, SA, billion $ PCND BEA
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods CVM, SA, billion $ PCNDGC96 BEA
Civilian Noninstitutional Population NSA, 1000s CNP160V BLS
Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour SA, Index 2005=100 COMPNFB BLS
Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons SA, Index 2005=100 HOANBS BLS
Effective Federal Funds Rate NSA, percent FEDFUNDS BG
Total Equity NSA EQTA IEC
Total Assets NSA H.8 FRB
All Employees SA B-1 BLS
Average Weekly Hours SA B-7 BLS
CP = current prices, CVM = chained volume measures (2005 Dollars), SA = seasonally adjusted, NSA = not seasonally adjusted. BEA
= U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BLS = U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics and BG
= Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, IEC = Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, FRB = Federal Reserve
Board.
C Model Details and Derivations
We provide the model details and derivations required for replication of the model. We begin
with the financial sector followed by the normalization of the model to render it stationary, the
description of the steady state and the log-linearized model equations.
C.1 Financial Intermediaries
This section describes in detail how the setup of Gertler and Karadi (2011) is adapted for the
two sector model and describes in detail how the equations for financial intermediaries in the
main text are derived.
The balance sheet of a financial intermediary for the consumption or investment sector can
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be expressed as,
Qx,tSx,t = Nx,t +
Bx,t
PC,t
, x = C, I,
where Sx,t denotes the quantity of financial claims on non-financial firms held by the inter-
mediary and Qx,t denotes the price of a claim in the consumption or investment sector. The
variable Nx,t represents the bank’s wealth at the end of period t and Bx,t are the deposits the
intermediary for the consumption or investment sector obtains from households.30 Banks inter-
mediate the demand and supply for equity from households to the producers in the two sectors.
Additionally, they engage in maturity transformation by holding long term assets of borrowers
which are funded with the bank’s own equity capital and lenders short term liabilities. The as-
sets held by the financial intermediary of sector x at time t pay in the next period the stochastic
return RBx,t+1 from borrowers in this sector. Intermediaries pay at t+ 1 the non-contingent real
gross return Rt to households for their deposits made at time t. Then, the intermediary’s wealth
evolves over time as,
Nx,t+1 = R
B
x,t+1Qx,tSx,t − Rt
Bx,t
PC,t
= RBx,t+1Qx,tSx,t − Rt(Qx,tSx,t −Nx,t)
= (RBx,t+1 − Rt)Qx,tSx,t +RtNx,t.
The premium, RBx,t+1 − Rt, as well as the quantity of assets, Qx,tSx,t, determines the growth
in bank’s wealth above the riskless return. Therefore, the bank will not fund any assets with a
negative discounted premium. It follows that for the bank to operate in period i the following
inequality must hold,
Etβ
iΛBt+1+i(R
B
x,t+1+i −Rt+i) ≥ 0, i ≥ 0,
where βiΛBt+1+i is the bank’s stochastic discount factor, with,
ΛBt+1 ≡
Λt+1
Λt
,
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget equation. Under perfect capital
markets, arbitrage guarantees that the risk premium collapses to zero and the relation always
holds with equality. However, under imperfect capital markets, credit constraints rooted in the
bank’s inability to obtain enough funds may lead to positive risk premia. As long as the above
inequality holds, banks for the investment and the consumption sector will keep building assets
by borrowing additional funds from households. Accordingly, the intermediaries in sector x
have the objective to maximize expected terminal wealth,
Vx,t =maxEt
∑
i=0
(1− θB)θ
i
Bβ
iΛBt+1+iNx,t+1+i
=maxEt
∑
i=0
(1− θB)θ
i
Bβ
iΛBt+1+i[(R
B
x,t+1+i −Rt+i)Qx,t+iS
p
x,t+i +Rt+iNx,t+i], (C.1)
30The total quantity of bonds held by households, Bt, is the sum of bonds from the intermediaries of the two
sectors as well as the government
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where θB ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of bankers at t that survive until period t + 1.
Following the setup in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) the banks
are limited from infinitely borrowing additional funds from households by a moral hazard/costly
enforcement problem. On the one hand, the agent who works in the bank can choose at the be-
ginning of each period to divert the fraction λB of available funds and transfer it back to the
household. On the other hand, depositors can force the bank into bankruptcy and recover a
fraction 1 − λB of assets.31 Note that the fraction, λB , which intermediaries can divert is the
same across sectors to guarantee that the household is indifferent between lending funds to the
bank in the consumption and the investment sector.
Given this tradeoff, lenders will only supply funds to the financial intermediary when the
bank’s maximized expected terminal wealth is larger or equal to the bank’s gain from diverting
the fraction λB of available funds. This incentive constraint can be formalized as,
Vx,t ≥ λBQx,tSx,t, 0 < λB < 1. (C.2)
Using equation (C.1), the expression for Vx,t can be written as the following first-order differ-
ence equation,
Vx,t = νx,tQx,tSx,t + ηx,tNx,t,
with,
νx,t = Et{(1− θB)Λ
B
t+1(R
B
x,t+1 − Rt) + θBβZ
x
1,t+1νx,t+1},
ηx,t = Et{(1− θB)Λ
B
t+1Rt + θBβZ
x
2,t+1ηx,t+1},
and,
Zx1,t+1+i ≡
Qx,t+1+iSx,t+1+i
Qx,t+iSx,t+i
, Zx2,t+1+i ≡
Nx,t+1+i
Nx,t+i
.
The variable νx,t can be interpreted in the following way: For an intermediary of sector
x it is the expected discounted marginal gain of expanding assets Qx,tSx,t by one unit while
holding wealth Nx,t constant. The interpretation of ηx,t is analogous: For an intermediary of
sector x it is the expected discounted value of having an additional unit of wealth, Nx,t, holding
the quantity of financial claims, Sx,t, constant. The gross growth rate in assets is denoted by
Zx1,t+i and the gross growth rate of net worth is denoted by Zx2,t+i.
Then, using the expression for Vx,t, we can express the bank’s incentive constraint (C.2) as,
νx,tQx,tSx,t + ηx,tNx,t ≥ λBQx,tSx,t.
As indicated above, under perfect capital markets banks will expand borrowing until the risk
premium collapses to zero which implies that in this case νx,t equals zero as well. However, due
to the moral hazard/costly enforcement problem introduced above capital markets are imperfect
in this setup. Imperfect capital markets may limit the possibilities for this kind of arbitrage
31We follow the assumption in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) that it is too costly for the depositors to recover the
fraction λB of funds.
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because the intermediaries are constrained by their equity capital. If the incentive constraint
binds it follows that,
Qx,tSx,t =
ηx,t
λB − νx,t
Nx,t
= ̺x,tNx,t. (C.3)
In this case the quantity of assets which the intermediary can acquire depends on the equity
capital, Nx,t, as well as the intermediary’s leverage ratio, ̺x,t. This leverage ratio is the ratio
of the bank’s intermediated assets to equity. The moral hazard/costly enforcement problem
constraints the bank’s ability to acquire assets because it introduces an endogenous capital con-
straint. By raising the leverage ratio through an increase in νx,t, the bank’s incentive to divert
funds and the bank’s opportunity costs from being forced into bankruptcy by the depositors
increase. The bank’s leverage ratio is limited to the point where its maximized expected termi-
nal wealth equals the gains from diverting the fraction λB from available funds. However, the
constraint (C.3) binds only if 0 < νx,t < λB (given Nx,t > 0). As described above, the case
νx,t < 0 implies a negative interest rate premium leading the bank to stop operating. In case
interest rate premia are relatively high causing νx,t to be larger than λB , the value of operating
always exceeds the bank’s gain from diverting funds.
Using the leverage ratio (C.3) we can express the evolution of the intermediary’s wealth as,
Nx,t+1 = [(R
B
x,t+1 −Rt)̺x,t +Rt]Nx,t.
From this equation it also follows that,
Zx2,t+1 =
Nx,t+1
Nx,t
= (RBx,t+1 −Rt)̺x,t +Rt,
and,
Zx1,t+1 =
Qx,t+1Sx,t+1
Qx,tSx,t
=
̺x,t+1Nx,t+1
̺x,tNx,t
=
̺x,t+1
̺x,t
Zx2,t+1.
Financial intermediaries which are forced into bankruptcy can be replaced by new entering
banks. Therefore, total wealth of financial intermediaries is the sum of the net worth of existing,
N ex,t, and new ones, Nnx,t,
Nx,t = N
e
x,t +N
n
x,t.
The fraction θB of bankers at t− 1 which survive until t is equal across sectors. Then, the law
of motion for existing bankers in sector x = C, I is given by,
N ex,t =θB [(R
B
x,t − Rt−1)̺x,t−1 +Rt−1]Nx,t−1, 0 < θB < 1. (C.4)
where a main source of fluctuations is the ex-post excess return on assets, RBx,t − Rt−1, which
increases in impact on N ex,t in the leverage ratio.
57
New banks receive startup funds from their respective household which are equal to a small
fraction of the value of assets held by the existing bankers in their final operating period. Given
that the exit probability is i.i.d., the value of assets held by the existing bankers in their final
operating period is given by (1 − θB)Qx,tSx,t. The respective household transfers a fraction,
̟, of this value to the new intermediaries in the two sectors which leads to the following
formulation for new banker’s wealth,
Nnx,t = ̟Qx,tSx,t, 0 < ̟ < 1. (C.5)
Existing banker’s net worth (C.4) and entering banker’s net worth (C.5) lead to the law of
motion for total net worth,
Nx,t =
(
θB [(R
B
x,t − Rt−1)̺x,t−1 +Rt−1]Nx,t−1 +̟Qx,tSx,t
)
ςx,t,
where the variable ςx,t is a shock to the bank’s equity capital. This shock evolves according to,
log ςx,t = ρςx log ςx,t−1 + ǫ
ς
x,t, x = C, I
where ρςx ∈ (0, 1) and ǫςx,t is i.i.d N(0, σ2ςx).
The external finance premium for sectors x = C, I can be defined as,
R∆x,t = R
B
x,t+1 − Rt.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) state that the financial structure with a one period bond allows inter-
preting the external finance premium as a credit spread.
Since Rt, λB , ̟ and θB are equal across sectors, the institutional setup of the two repre-
sentative banks in the two sectors is symmetric. Both banks hold bonds from households and
buy assets from firms in the respective sector. Their performance differs because the demand
for capital differs across sectors resulting in sector specific prices of capital, Qx,t, and nominal
rental rates for capital, RKx,t. Note that the institutional setup of banks does not depend on firm-
specific factors. Gertler and Karadi (2011) show that this implies that a setup with a continuum
of banks is equivalent to a formulation with a representative bank. Owing to the symmetry of
the banks this also holds for our formulation of financial intermediaries in the two-sector setup.
C.2 Stationary Economy
The model includes two non-stationary technology shocks, At and Vt. This section shows how
we normalize the model to render it stationary. Lower case variables denote normalized sta-
tionary variables.
The model variables can be stationarized as follows:
kx,t =
Kx,t
V
1
1−ai
t
, k¯x,t =
K¯x,t
V
1
1−ai
t
, kt =
Kt
V
1
1−ai
t
, (C.6)
ix,t =
Ix,t
V
1
1−ai
t
, it =
It
V
1
1−ai
t
, ct =
Ct
AtV
ac
1−ai
t
, (C.7)
rKC,t =
RKC,t
PC,t
A−1t V
1−ac
1−ai
t , r
K
I,t =
RKI,t
PC,t
A−1t V
1−ac
1−ai
t , wt =
Wt
PC,tAtV
ac
1−ai
t
. (C.8)
58
From
PI,t
PC,t
=
mcC,t
mcI,t
1− ac
1− ai
At
Vt
(KI,t
LI,t
)−ai(KC,t
LC,t
)ac
=
mcC,t
mcI,t
1− ac
1− ai
AtV
ac−1
1−ai
t
( kI,t
LI,t
)−ai( kC,t
LC,t
)ac
,
follows that
pi,t =
PI,t
PC,t
A−1t V
1−ac
1−ai
t . (C.9)
and the multipliers are normalized as
λt = ΛtAtV
ac
1−ai
t , φx,t = Φx,tV
1
1−ai
t . (C.10)
where Φx,t denotes the multiplier on the respective capital accumulation equation. Using the
growth of investment, it follows from the equations of the price of capital that
qx,t = Qx,tA
−1
t V
1−ac
1−ai
t .
with the price of capital in sector x, defined as
qx,t = φx,t/λt, x = C, I.
Using the growth of capital, it follows from the borrow in advance constraint that
sx,t =
Sx,t
V
1
1−ai
t
.
Then, it follows from entering bankers wealth equation (C.5) that
nnx,t = N
n
x,tA
−1
t V
−ac
1−ai
t .
Total wealth, wealth of existing and entering bankers has to grow at the same rate
nex,t = N
e
x,tA
−1
t V
−ac
1−ai
t , nx,t = Nx,tA
−1
t V
−ac
1−ai
t .
C.2.1 Intermediate goods producers
Firm’s production function in the consumption sector:
ct = L
1−ac
C,t k
ac
C,t − FC . (C.11)
Firm’s production function in the investment sector:
it = L
1−ai
I,t k
ai
I,t − FI . (C.12)
Marginal costs in the consumption sector:
mcC,t = (1− ac)
ac−1a−acc (r
K
C,t)
acw1−act . (C.13)
Marginal costs in the investment sector:
mcI,t = (1− ai)
ai−1a−aii w
1−ai
t (r
K
I,t)
aip−1i,t , with pi,t =
PI,t
PC,t
. (C.14)
Capital labour ratios in the two sectors:
kC,t
LC,t
=
wt
rKC,t
ac
1− ac
,
kI,t
LI,t
=
wt
rKI,t
ai
1− ai
. (C.15)
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C.2.2 Firms’ pricing decisions
Price setting equation for firms that change their price in sector x = C, I:
0 = Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξsp,xβ
sλt+sx˜t+s
[
p˜x,tΠ˜t,t+s − (1 + λ
x
p,t+s)mcx,t+s
]}
, (C.16)
with
Π˜t,t+s =
s∏
k=1
[(πx,t+k−1
πx
)ιpx(πx,t+k
πx
)−1]
and x˜t+s =
( P˜x,t
Px,t
Π˜t,t+s
)− 1+λxp,t+s
λx
p,t+s xt+s
and P˜x,t
Px,t
= p˜x,t.
Aggregate price index in the consumption sector:
1 =
[
(1− ξx,p)(p˜x,t)
1
λx
p,t + ξx,p
[(πx,t−1
πx
)ιpx(πx,t
πx
)−1] 1
λx
p,t
]λxp,t
.
It further holds that
πI,t
πC,t
=
pi,t
pi,t−1
. (C.17)
C.2.3 Household’s optimality conditions and wage setting
Marginal utility of income:
λt =
bt
ct − hct−1
(
At−1
At
)(
Vt−1
Vt
) ac
1−ai
− βh
bt+1
ct+1
(
At+1
At
)(
Vt+1
Vt
) ac
1−ai − hct
. (C.18)
Euler equation:
λt = βEtλt+1
( At
At+1
)( Vt
Vt+1
) ac
1−aiRt
1
πc,t+1
.
Labor supply
λtwt = btϕ(LC,t + LI,t)
ν ,
C.2.4 Capital services
Optimal capital utilization in both sectors:
rKC,t = a
′
C(uC,t), r
K
I,t = a
′
I(uI,t).
Definition of capital services in both sectors:
kC,t = uC,tξ
K
C,tk¯C,t−1
(Vt−1
Vt
) 1
1−ai , kI,t = uI,tξ
K
I,tk¯I,t−1
(Vt−1
Vt
) 1
1−ai . (C.19)
Optimal choice of available capital in sector x = C, I:
φx,t = βEtξ
K
x,t+1
{
λt+1
( Vt
Vt+1
) 1
1−ai (rKx,t+1ux,t+1 − a(ux,t+1)) + (1− δ)Etφx,t+1
( Vt
Vt+1
) 1
1−ai
}
,
(C.20)
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C.2.5 Physical capital producers
Optimal choice of investment in sector x = C, I:
[i−ρI,t+i
−ρ
C,t
]− 1
ρ
−1
i−ρ−1x,t λtpi,t
=φx,t
[
1− S
( ix,t
ix,t−1
( Vt
Vt−1
) 1
1−ai
)
− S ′
( ix,t
ix,t−1
( Vt
Vt−1
) 1
1−ai
) ix,t
ix,t−1
( Vt
Vt−1
) 1
1−ai
]
+ βEtφx,t+1
( Vt
Vt+1
) 1
1−ai
[
S ′
(ix,t+1
ix,t
(Vt+1
Vt
) 1
1−ai
)( ix,t+1
ix,t
(Vt+1
Vt
) 1
1−ai
)2]
. (C.21)
Accumulation of capital in sector x = C, I:
k¯x,t = (1− δx)ξ
K
x,tk¯x,t−1
(Vt−1
Vt
) 1
1−ai +
(
1− S
( ix,t
ix,t−1
( Vt
Vt−1
) 1
1−ai
))
ix,t, (C.22)
C.2.6 Household’s wage setting
Household’s wage setting:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsξswλt+sL˜t+s
[
w˜tΠ˜
w
t,t+s − (1 + λw,t+s)bt+sϕ
L˜νt+s
λt+s
]
= 0, (C.23)
with
Π˜wt,t+s =
s∏
k=1
[(
πC,t+k−1e
at+k−1+
ac
1−ai
vt+k−1
πce
ga+
ac
1−ai
gv
)ιw(
πC,t+ke
at+k+
ac
1−ai
vt+k
πCe
ga+
ac
1−ai
gv
)−1]
and
L˜t+s =
(w˜tΠ˜wt,t+s
wt+s
)− 1+λw,t+s
λw,t+s Lt+s.
Wages evolve according to
wt =
{
(1− ξw)w˜
1
λw,t
t + ξw
[(πc,t−1eat−1+ ac1−ai vt−1
πce
ga+
ac
1−ai
gv
)lw(πc,teat+ ac1−ai vt
πce
ga+
ac
1−ai
gv
)−1
wt−1
] 1
λw,t
}λw,t
.
C.2.7 Financial Intermediation
The stationary stochastic discount factor can be expressed as
λBt+1 =
λt+1
λt
.
Then, one can derive expressions for νx,t and ηx,t
νx,t = Et{(1− θB)λ
B
t+1
At
At+1
( Vt
Vt+1
) ac
1−ai (RBx,t+1 −Rt) + θBβz
x
1,t+1νx,t+1},
ηx,t = Et{(1− θB)λ
B
t+1
At
At+1
( Vt
Vt+1
) ac
1−aiRt + θBβz
x
2,t+1ηx,t+1},
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with
zx1,t+1+i ≡
qx,t+1+isx,t+1+i
qx,t+isx,t+i
At+1
At
(Vt+1
Vt
) ac
1−ai , zx2,t+1+i ≡
nx,t+1+i
nx,t+i
At+1
At
(Vt+1
Vt
) ac
1−ai .
It follows that if the bank’s incentive constraint binds it can be expressed as
νx,tqx,tsx,t + ηx,tnx,t = λBqx,tsx,t
⇔qx,tsx,t = ̺x,tnx,t,
with the leverage ratio given as
̺x,t =
ηx,t
λB − νx,t
.
It further follows that:
zx2,t+1 =
nx,t+1
nx,t
At+1
At
(Vt+1
Vt
) ac
1−ai = (RBx,t+1 − Rt)̺x,t +Rt,
and
zx1,t+1 =
qx,t+1sx,t+1
qx,tsx,t
At+1
At
(Vt+1
Vt
) ac
1−ai =
̺x,t+1nx,t+1
̺x,tnx,t
At+1
At
(Vt+1
Vt
) ac
1−ai =
̺x,t+1
̺x,t
zx2,t+1.
The normalized equation for bank’s wealth accumulation is
nx,t =
(
θB[(R
B
x,t − Rt−1)̺x,t−1 +Rt−1]
At−1
At
(Vt−1
Vt
) ac
1−ai nx,t−1 +̟qx,tsx,t
)
ςx,t.
The borrow in advance constraint:
k¯x,t+1 = sx,t.
The leverage equation:
qx,tsx,t = ̺x,tnx,t.
Bank’s stochastic return on assets can be described in normalized variables as:
RBx,t+1 =
rKx,t+1ux,t+1 + qx,t+1(1− δx)− a(ux,t+1)
qx,t
ξKx,t+1
At+1
At
(Vt+1
Vt
)− 1−ac
1−ai ,
knowing from the main model that
rKx,t =
RKx,t
Px,t
A−1t V
1−ac
1−ai
t .
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C.2.8 Monetary policy and market clearing
Monetary policy rule:
Rt
R
=
(Rt−1
R
)ρR[(πt
π
)φπ( πt
πt−1
)φ∆π( yt
yt−1
)φ∆Y ]1−ρR
ηmp,t,
Resource constraint in the consumption sector:
ct + (a(uC,t)k¯C,t−1 + a(uI,t)k¯I,t−1)
(Vt−1
Vt
) 1
1−ai = L1−acC,t k
ac
C,t − FC .
Resource constraint in the investment sector:
it = L
1−ai
I,t k
ai
I,t − FI .
Definition of GDP:
yt = ct + pi,tit +
(
1−
1
et
)
yt. (C.24)
Moreover
Lt = LI,t + LC,t, it =
[
i−ρI,t + i
−ρ
C,t
]− 1
ρ
.
C.3 Steady State
This section describes the model’s steady state.
From the optimal choice of available capital (C.20) and the optimal choice of investment
(C.21) in both sectors:
rKC =
(
e
1
1−ai
gv
β
− (1− δC)
)
(i−ρI + i
−ρ
C )
− 1
ρ
−1i−ρ−1C pi, (C.25)
rKI =
(
e
1
1−ai
gv
β
− (1− δI)
)
(i−ρI + i
−ρ
C )
− 1
ρ
−1i−ρ−1I pi. (C.26)
From firm’s price setting in both sectors (C.16)
mcC =
1
1 + λCp
, mcI =
1
1 + λIp
. (C.27)
Using equations (C.27) and imposing knowledge of the steady state expression for rKC and rKI ,
one can derive expressions for the steady state wage from the equations for the marginal costs
in both sectors ((C.13) and (C.14)):
Consumption sector:
w =
(
1
1 + λCp
(1− ac)
1−acaacc (r
K
C )
−ac
) 1
1−ac
. (C.28)
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Investment sector:
w =
(
1
1 + λIp
(1− ai)
1−aiaaii (r
K
I )
−aipi
) 1
1−ai
. (C.29)
Since labour can move across sectors the steady state wage has to be the same in the consump-
tion and investment sector. The equality is verified by pi. An expression for pi can be found by
setting (C.28) equal to (C.29):
( 1
1 + λCp
(1− ac)
1−acaacc (r
K
C )
−ac
) 1
1−ac
=
( 1
1 + λIp
(1− ai)
1−aiaaii (r
K
I )
−aipi
) 1
1−ai
⇔
( 1
1 + λCp
(1− ac)
1−acaacc
(e 11−ai gv
β
− (1− δC)
)−ac[
(i−ρI + i
−ρ
C )
− 1
ρ
−1i−ρ−1C
]−ac
p−aci
) 1
1−ac
=
( 1
1 + λIp
(1− ai)
1−aiaaii
(e 11−ai gv
β
− (1− δI)
)−ai
p−aii
[
(i−ρI + i
−ρ
C )
− 1
ρ
−1i−ρ−1I
]−aipi) 11−ai
⇔pi =
1
1+λCp
(1− ac)
1−acaacc
(
e
1
1−ai
gv
β
− (1− δC)
)−αc[
(i−ρI + i
−ρ
C )
− 1
ρ
−1i−ρ−1C
]−ac
[
1
1+λIp
(1− ai)1−aia
ai
i
(
e
1
1−ai
gv
β
− (1− δI)
)−αi[
(i−ρI + i
−ρ
C )
− 1
ρ
−1i−ρ−1I
]−ai] 1−ac1−ai .
(C.30)
Knowing w, rKC and rKI , the expressions given in (C.15) can be used to find the steady state
capital-to-labour ratios in the two sectors:
kC
LC
=
w
rKC
ac
1− ac
, (C.31)
kI
LI
=
w
rKI
ai
1− ac
. (C.32)
The zero profit condition for intermediate goods producers in the consumption sector, c −
rKC kC − wLC = 0, and (C.11) imply:
L1−acC k
ac
C − FC − r
K
C kC − wLC = 0
⇔
FC
LC
=
( kC
LC
)ac
− rKC
kC
LC
− w.
Analogously the zero profit condition for intermediate goods producers in the investment sector,
i− rKI kI − wLI = 0, and (C.12) imply:
FI
LI
=
( kI
LI
)ai
− rKI
kI
LI
− w.
These expressions pin down the steady state consumption-to-labour and investment-to-labour
ratios which follow from the intermediate firms’ production functions ((C.11) and (C.12)):
c
LC
=
( kC
LC
)ac
−
FC
LC
,
i
LI
=
( kI
LI
)ai
−
FI
LI
.
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1 + λCp =
c+ FC
c
⇔ λCp c = FC , and 1 + λIp =
i+ FI
i
⇔ λIpi = FI .
This and the steady state consumption-to-labour ratio can be used to derive an expression for
steady state consumption:
c =
( kC
LC
)ac
LC − FC
⇔c =
( kC
LC
)ac
LC − λ
C
p c
⇔c =
1
1 + λCp
( kC
LC
)ac
LC .
Analogously one can derive an expression for steady state investment:
i =
1
1 + λIp
( kI
LI
)ai
LI .
Combining these two expressions leads to
pi
i
c
=
1
1+λIp
(
kI
LI
)aiLI
1
1+λCp
(
kC
LC
)ac
LC
pi
⇔
LI
LC
= pi
i
c
1
1+λCp
(
kC
LC
)ac
1
1+λIp
(
kI
LI
)ai p−1i .
Total labour L is set to unity in the steady state. However, since ai and ac are not necessarily
calibrated to be equal one needs to fix another quantity in addition to L = 1. We fix the
steady state investment-to-consumption ratio, pi ic , which equals 0.399 in the data. This allows
us to derive steady state expressions for labour in the two sectors. Steady state labour in the
investment sector is given by
LI = 1− LC , (C.33)
and the two equations above imply that steady state labour in the consumption sector can be
expressed as
LC =
(
1 + pi
i
c
1
1+λCp
(
kC
LC
)ac
1
1+λIp
(
kI
LI
)ai p−1i
)−1
. (C.34)
The steady state values for labour in the two sectors imply:
kC =
kC
LC
LC , kI =
kI
LI
LI , c =
c
LC
LC , i =
i
LI
LI , FC =
FC
LC
LC , FI =
FI
LI
LI .
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It follows from (C.19) that
kC = k¯Ce
− 1
1−ai
gv , and kI = k¯Ie−
1
1−ai
gv .
The accumulation equation of available capital (C.22) can be used to solve for investment in
the two sectors:
iC =kC
(
1− e
− 1
1−ai
gv(1− δC)
)
, (C.35)
iI =kI
(
1− e
− 1
1−ai
gv(1− δI)
)
. (C.36)
From the definition of GDP (C.24):
y = c+ pii+
(
1−
1
g
)
y.
From the marginal utility of income (C.18):
λ =
1
c− hce
−ga− ac1−ai gv
−
βh
ce
ga+
ac
1−ai
gv − hc
.
From the household’s wage setting (C.23)
∞∑
s=0
βsξswλL
[
w − (1 + λw)ϕ
Lν
λ
]
= 0,
follows the expression for L:
w − (1− λw)ϕ
Lν
λ
= 0 ⇒ L =
[ wλ
(1 + λw)ϕ
] 1
ν
.
This expression can be solved for ϕ to be consistent with L = 1:
1 =
[ wλ
(1 + λw)ϕ
] 1
ν
⇔ϕ =
1 + λw
λw
.
It further holds from equation (C.17) that
πI
πC
= e
ga− 1−ac1−ai gv
Due to the nonlinearity introduced by the intratemporal investment adjustment costs one
cannot solve analytically for the steady state. A system of 10 equations (C.25, C.26, C.28,
C.30, C.31, C.32, C.33, C.34, C.35, C.36) is solved numerically for the 10 steady state vari-
ables kC , kI , w, iC , iI , rKC , rKI , LC , LI and pi. The steady state values for the remaining
variables follow from the expressions above.
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Given these steady state variables, the remaining steady state values which are mainly re-
lated to financial intermediaries can be derived as follows.
The nominal interest rate is given from the Euler equation as
R =
1
β
e
ga+
ac
1−ai
gvπC .
The bank’s stationary stochastic discount factor can be expressed in the steady state as
λB = 1.
The steady state borrow in advance constraint implies that
k¯x = sx.
The steady state price of capital is given by
qx,t = pi,t.
The steady state leverage equation is set equal to it’s average value in the data
qxsx
nx
= ̺x = 5.47.
The parameters ̟ and λB help aligning the value of the leverage ratio and the interest rate
spread with their empirical counterparts. Using the calibrated value for θB , the average value
for the leverage ratio (5.47) and the weighted quarterly average of the credit spreads (RBx −R =
0.005) allows calibrating ̟ using the bank’s wealth accumulation equation
̟ =
[
1− θB [(R
B
x − R)̺x +R]e
−ga− ac1−ai gv
](qxsx
nx
)−1
.
Given the non-linearity in the leverage ratio, we solve numerically for the steady state expres-
sions for η and ν using
νx = (1− θB)λ
Be
−ga− ac1−ai gv(RBx − R) + θBβz
x
1νx,
ηx = (1− θB)λ
Be
−ga− ac1−ai gvR + θBβz
x
2ηx,
with
zx2 = (R
B
x −R)̺x +R, and zx1 = zx2 ,
and the steady state leverage ratio
̺x =
ηx
λB − νx
.
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C.4 Log-linearized Economy
This section collects the log-linearized model equations. The log-linear deviations of all vari-
ables are defined as
ςˆt ≡ log ςt − log ς,
except for
zˆt ≡ zt − ga,
vˆt ≡ vt − gv,
λˆCp,t ≡ log(1 + λ
C
p,t)− log(1 + λ
C
p ),
λˆIp,t ≡ log(1 + λ
I
p,t)− log(1 + λ
I
p),
λˆw,t ≡ log(1 + λw,t)− log(1 + λw).
C.4.1 Firm’s production function and cost minimization
Production function for the intermediate good producing firm (i) in the consumption sector:
cˆt =
c + FI
c
[ackˆC,t + (1− ac)LˆC,t].
Production function for the intermediate good producing firm (i) in the investment sector:
iˆt =
i+ FI
i
[aikˆI,t + (1− ai)LˆI,t].
Capital-to-labour ratios for the two sectors:
rˆKC,t − wˆt = LˆC,t − kˆC,t, rˆ
K
I,t − wˆt = LˆI,t − kˆI,t. (C.37)
Marginal cost in both sectors:
mˆcC,t = acrˆ
K
C,t + (1− ac)wˆt, mˆcI,t = airˆ
K
I,t + (1− ai)wˆt − pˆi,t. (C.38)
C.4.2 Firm’s prices
Price setting equation for firms that change their price in sector x = C, I:
0 = Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξsp,xβ
s
[
ˆ˜px,t
ˆ˜Πt,t+s − λˆ
x
p,t+s − mˆcx,t+s
]}
,
with
ˆ˜Πt,t+s =
s∑
k=1
[ιpxπˆt+k−1 − πˆt+k].
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Solving for the summation
1
1− ξp,xβ
ˆ˜px,t =Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξsp,xβ
s
[
− Πˆt,t+s + λˆ
x
p,t+s + mˆcx,t+s
]}
=− Πˆt,t + λˆ
x
p,t + mˆcx,t −
ξp,xβ
1− ξp,xβ
Πˆt,t+1
+ ξp,xβEt
{ ∞∑
s=1
ξs−1p,x β
s−1[− Πˆt+1,t+s + λˆxp,t+s + mˆcx,t+s]
}
=λˆxp,t + mˆcx,t +
ξp,xβ
1− ξp,xβ
Et
[
ˆ˜px,t+1 − Πˆt,t+1
]
,
where we used Πˆt,t = 0.
Prices evolve as
0 = (1− ξp,x)ˆ˜px,t + ξp,x(ιpxπˆt−1 − πˆ),
from which we obtain the Phillips curve in sector x = C, I:
πˆx,t =
β
1 + ιpxβ
Etπˆx,t+1 +
ιpx
1 + ιpxβ
πˆx,t−1 + κxmˆcx,t + κxλˆ
x
p,t, (C.39)
with κx =
(1− ξp,xβ)(1− ξp,x)
ξp,x(1 + ιpxβ)
.
From equation (C.17) it follows that
πˆI,t − πˆC,t = pˆI,t − pˆI,t−1.
C.4.3 Households
Marginal utility:
λˆt =
eG
eG − hβ
[
bˆt +
(
zˆt +
ac
1− ai
vˆt
)
−
(
eG
eG − h
(
cˆt + zˆt +
ac
1− ai
vˆt
)
−
h
eG − h
cˆt−1
)]
−
hβ
eG − hβ
Et
[
bˆt+1 −
(
eG
eG − h
(
cˆt+1 + zˆt+1 +
ac
1− ai
vˆt+1
)
−
h
eG − h
cˆt
)]
⇔ λˆt =α1Etcˆt+1 − α2cˆt + α3cˆt−1 + α4zˆt + α5bˆt + α6vˆt, (C.40)
with
α1 =
hβeG
(eG − hβ)(eG − h)
, α2 =
e2G + h2β
(eG − hβ)(eG − h)
, α3 =
heG
(eG − hβ)(eG − h)
,
α4 =
hβeGρz − he
G
(eG − hβ)(eG − h)
, α5 =
eG − hβρb
eG − hβ
, α6 =
(hβeGρv − he
G) ac
1−ai
(eG − hβ)(eG − h)
,
eG = e
ga+
ac
1−ai
gv .
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This assumes the shock processes (1), (A.1) and (4).
Euler equation:
λˆt = Rˆt + Et
(
λˆt+1 − zˆt+1 − vˆt+1
ac
1− ai
− πˆC,t+1
)
. (C.41)
C.4.4 Investment and Capital
Capital utilisation in both sectors:
rˆKC,t = χC uˆC,t, rˆ
K
I,t = χI uˆI,t, where χ−1 =
a′(1)
a′′(1)
. (C.42)
Choice of investment for the consumption sector:
qˆC,t =e
2( 1
1−ai
gv)κ
(
iˆC,t − iˆC,t−1 +
1
1− ai
vˆt
)
− βe
2( 1
1−ai
gv)κEt
(
iˆC,t+1 − iˆC,t +
1
1− ai
vˆt+1
)
+ pˆi,t + (1 + ρ)
[
(i−ρI + i
−ρ
C )
−1(i−ρC iˆC,t + i
−ρ
I iˆI,t)− iˆC,t
]
, (C.43)
with qˆC,t = φˆC,t − λˆt.
Choice of investment for the investment sector:
qˆI,t =e
2( 1
1−ai
gv)κ
(
iˆI,t − iˆI,t−1 +
1
1− ai
vˆt
)
− βe
2( 1
1−ai
gv)κEt
(
iˆI,t+1 − iˆI,t +
1
1− ai
vˆt+1
)
+ pˆi,t + (1 + ρ)
[
(i−ρI + i
−ρ
C )
−1(i−ρC iˆC,t + i
−ρ
I iˆI,t)− iˆI,t
]
, (C.44)
with qˆI,t = φˆI,t − λˆt.
Capital input in both sectors:
kˆC,t = uˆC,t + ξ
K
C,t +
ˆ¯kC,t−1 −
1
1− ai
vˆt, kˆI,t = uˆI,t + ξ
K
I,t +
ˆ¯kI,t−1 −
1
1− ai
vˆt. (C.45)
Capital accumulation in the consumption and investment sector:
ˆ¯kC,t = (1− δC)e
− 1
1−ai
gv
(
ˆ¯kC,t−1 + ξ
K
C,t −
1
1− ai
vˆt
)
+
(
1− (1− δC)e
− 1
1−ai
gv
)
iˆC,t, (C.46)
ˆ¯kI,t = (1− δI)e
− 1
1−ai
gv
(
ˆ¯kI,t−1 + ξ
K
I,t −
1
1− ai
vˆt
)
+
(
1− (1− δI)e
− 1
1−ai
gv
)
iˆI,t. (C.47)
C.4.5 Wages
The wage setting equation for workers renegotiating their salary:
0 =Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξswβ
s
[
ˆ˜wt +
ˆ˜Πwt,t+s − λˆw,t+s − bˆt+s − ν
ˆ˜Lt+s + λˆt+s
]}
,
with
ˆ˜Πwt,t+s =
s∑
k=1
[
ιw
(
πˆc,t+k−1 + zˆt+k−1 +
ac
1− ai
vˆt+k−1
)
−
(
πˆc,t+k + zˆt+k +
ac
1− ai
vˆt+k
)]
,
and
ˆ˜Lt+s =Lˆt+s −
(
1 +
1
λw
)(
ˆ˜wt +
ˆ˜Πwt,t+s − wˆt+s
)
.
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Then using the labor demand function,
0 =Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξswβ
s
[
ˆ˜wt +
ˆ˜Πwt,t+s − λˆw,t+s − bˆt+s
− ν
(
Lˆt+s −
(
1 +
1
λw
)(
ˆ˜wt +
ˆ˜Πwt,t+s − wˆt+s
))
+ λˆt+s
]}
⇔ 0 =Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξswβ
s
[
ˆ˜wt
(
1 + ν
(
1 +
1
λw
))
+ ˆ˜Πwt,t+s − λˆw,t+s − bˆt+s
− ν
(
Lˆt+s −
(
1 +
1
λw
)( ˆ˜Πwt,t+s − wˆt+s))+ λˆt+s]}.
Solving for the summation
νw
1− ξwβ
ˆ˜wt =Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξswβ
s
[
−
(
1 + ν
(
1 +
1
λw
)) ˆ˜Πwt,t+s + ψˆt+s]}
=− νw
ˆ˜Πwt,t + ψˆt + Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξswβ
s
[
− νw
ˆ˜Πwt,t+s + ψˆt+s
]}
=ψˆt −
ξwβ
1− ξwβ
νwΠˆ
w
t,t+1 + ξwβEt
{ ∞∑
s=0
ξswβ
s[−νwΠˆ
w
t+1,t+1+s + ψˆt+1+s]
}
=ψˆt +
ξwβ
1− ξwβ
νwEt
[
ˆ˜wt+1 −
ˆ˜Πwt,t+1
]
. (C.48)
where
ψˆt ≡ λˆw,t + bˆt + νLˆt + ν
(
1 +
1
λw
)
wˆt − λˆt, (C.49)
νw ≡ 1 + ν
(
1 +
1
λw
)
,
and recall that ˆ˜Πwt,t = 0.
Wages evolve as
wˆt = (1− ξw) ˆ˜wt + ξw
(
wˆt−1 + ιwπˆc,t−1 + ιw
(
zˆt−1 +
ac
1− ai
vˆt−1
)
− πˆc,t − zˆt −
ac
1− ai
vˆt
)
⇔wˆt = (1− ξw) ˆ˜wt + ξw(wˆt−1 +
ˆ˜Πwt,t−1). (C.50)
Equation (C.50) can be solved for ˆ˜wt. This expression, as well as the formulation for ψˆt given
in (C.49) can be plugged into equation (C.48). After reformulation this yields the wage Phillips
curve The wage Phillips curve can be derived to be:
wˆt =
1
1 + β
wˆt−1 +
β
1 + β
Etwˆt+1 − κwgˆw,t +
ιw
1 + β
πˆc,t−1 −
1 + βιw
1 + β
πˆc,t
+
β
1 + β
Etπˆc,t+1 + κwλˆw,t +
ιw
1 + β
(
zˆt−1 +
ac
1− ai
vˆt−1
)
−
1 + βιw − ρzβ
1 + β
zˆt −
1 + βιw − ρvβ
1 + β
ac
1− ai
vˆt. (C.51)
71
where
κw ≡
(1− ξwβ)(1− ξw)
ξw(1 + β)
(
1 + ν
(
1 + 1
λw
)) ,
gˆw,t ≡ wˆt − (νLˆt + bˆt − λˆt).
C.4.6 Financial sector
The part of the economy concerned with the banking sector is described by the following equa-
tions:
The stochastic discount factor:
λˆBt = λˆt − λˆt−1. (C.52)
Definition of ν:
νˆx,t =(1− θBβz
x
1 )[λˆ
B
t+1 − zˆt+1 −
ac
1− ai
vˆt+1]
+
1− θBβz
x
1
RBx − R
[RBx Rˆ
B
x,t+1 − RRˆt] + θBβz
x
1 [zˆ
x
1,t+1 + νˆx,t+1], x = C, I. (C.53)
Definition of η:
ηˆx,t =(1− θBβz
x
2 )[λˆ
B
t+1 − zˆt+1 −
ac
1− ai
vˆt+1 + Rˆt]
+ θBβz
x
2 [zˆ
x
2,t+1 + ηˆt+1], x = C, I. (C.54)
Definition of z1:
zˆx1,t = ˆ̺x,t − ˆ̺x,t−1 + zˆ
x
2,t, x = C, I. (C.55)
Definition of z2:
zˆx2,t =
1
(RBx −R)̺x +R
[RBx ̺xRˆ
B
x,t +R(1− ̺x)Rˆt−1 + (R
B
x −R)̺x ˆ̺x,t−1], x = C, I.
(C.56)
The leverage ratio:
ˆ̺x,t = ηˆx,t +
ν
λB − ν
νˆx,t, x = C, I. (C.57)
The leverage equation:
qˆx,t + sˆx,t = ˆ̺x,t + nˆx,t. (C.58)
The bank’s wealth accumulation equation
nˆx,t =ςxθB̺xe
−ga− ac1−ai gv
[
RBx Rˆ
B
x,t +
( 1
̺x
− 1
)
RRˆt−1 + (R
B
x − R)ˆ̺x,t−1
]
+ ςxθBe
−ga− ac1−ai gv [(RBx − R)̺x +R]
[
− zˆt −
ac
1− ai
vˆt + nˆx,t−1
]
+ (1− ςxθBe
−ga− ac1−ai gv [(RBx − R)̺x +R])[qˆt + sˆt]
+ [θBe
−ga− ac1−ai gv((RBx −R)̺x +R) + (1− θB((R
B
x − R)̺x +R))]ςˆx,t, x = C, I.
(C.59)
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The borrow in advance constraint:
ˆ¯kx,t+1 = sˆx,t, x = C, I. (C.60)
The bank’s stochastic return on assets in sector x = C, I:
RˆBx,t =
1
rKx + qx(1− δx)
[rKx (rˆ
K
x,t + uˆx,t) + qx(1− δx)qˆx,t]− qˆx,t−1 + ξ
K
x,t + zˆt −
1− ac
1− ai
vˆt.
(C.61)
External finance premium:
Rˆ∆x,t = Rˆ
B
x,t+1 − Rˆt, x = C, I. (C.62)
C.4.7 Monetary policy and market clearing
Monetary policy rule:
Rˆt = ρRRˆt−1 + (1− ρR)
[
φππˆc,t + φ∆π(πˆc,t − ˆπc,t−1) + φ∆Y (yˆt − yˆt−1)
]
+ ηˆmp,t (C.63)
Resource constraint in the consumption sector:
cˆt +
(
rKC
k¯C
c
uˆC,t + r
K
I
k¯I
c
uˆI,t
)
e
− 1
1−ai
gv =
c+ Fc
c
[ackˆC,t + (1− ac)LˆC,t] (C.64)
Resource constraint in the investment sector:
iˆt =
i+ FI
i
[aikˆI,t + (1− ai)LˆI,t] (C.65)
Definition of GDP:
yˆt =
c
c+ pii
cˆt +
pii
c+ pii
(ˆit + pˆi,t) + eˆt. (C.66)
Market clearing:
LC
L
LˆC,t +
LI
L
LˆI,t = Lˆt,
[
i−ρC + i
−ρ
I
]−1(
i−ρI iˆI,t + i
−ρ
C iˆC,t
)
= iˆt. (C.67)
C.4.8 Exogenous processes
The exogenous processes of the 10 shocks can be written in log-linearized form as follows:
Price markup shock in sector x = C, I:
λˆxp,t = ρλxp λˆ
x
p,t−1 + ε
x
p,t. (C.68)
The TFP growth shock to the consumption sector:
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + ε
z
t . (C.69)
73
The TFP growth shock to the investment sector:
vˆt = ρv vˆt−1 + ε
v
t . (C.70)
Wage markup shock:
λˆw,t = ρwλˆw,t−1 + εw,t. (C.71)
Preference shock:
bˆt = ρbbˆt−1 + ε
b
t . (C.72)
Monetary policy shock:
ηˆmp,t = ε
mp
t . (C.73)
GDP measurement error:
eˆt = ρeeˆt−1 + ε
e
t . (C.74)
Shock to the bank’s equity capital in sector x = C, I:
ςˆx,t = ρςx ςˆx,t−1 + ǫ
ς
x,t. (C.75)
asset value shock in sector x = C, I:
ξˆKx,t = ρξK ,xξˆ
K
x,t−1 + ε
ξK
x,t with ε
ξK
x,t = ε
ξK,0
x,t + ε
ξK,news
x,t (C.76)
The entire log-linear model is summarized by equations (C.37) - (C.47) and (C.51) - (C.67) as
well as the shock processes (C.68) - (C.76).
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C.5 Measurement equations
For the estimation the model variables are linked with the observables using measurement
equations. For a description of our treatment of the data and their construction see Section 4
in the main body of the paper and Section B in the Appendix. Letting a superscript "d" denote
observable series, then the model’s measurement equations are,
real consumption growth,
∆Cdt ≡ log
( Ct
Ct−1
)
= log
( ct
ct−1
)
+ zˆt +
ac
1− ai
vˆt,
real investment growth,
∆Idt ≡ log
( It
It−1
)
= log
( it
it−1
)
+
1
1− ai
vˆt,
relative price of investment,(PI,t
PC,t
)d
≡ log
(PI,t
PC,t
/
PI,t−1
PC,t−1
)
= log
( pi,t
pi,t−1
)
+ zˆt +
ac − 1
1− ai
vˆt,
real wage growth,
∆W dt ≡ log
( Wt
Wt−1
)
= log
( wt
wt−1
)
+ zˆt +
ac
1− ai
vˆt,
real output growth,
∆Y dt ≡ log
( Yt
Yt−1
)
= log
( yt
yt−1
)
+ zˆt +
ac
1− ai
vˆt,
consumption sector inflation,
πdC,t ≡ πC,t = πˆC,t and πˆC,t = log(πC,t)− log(πC),
investment sector inflation,
πdI,t ≡ πI,t = πˆI,t and πˆI,t = log(πI,t)− log(πI),
total hours worked,
Ldt ≡ logLt = Lˆt,
federal funds rate,
Rdt ≡ logRt = log Rˆt,
consumption sector spread,
R∆,dC,t ≡ logR
∆
C,t = log Rˆ
B
C,t+1 − log Rˆt,
investment sector spread,
R∆,dI,t ≡ logR
∆
I,t = log Rˆ
B
I,t+1 − log Rˆt,
real total equity capital growth,
∆Ndt ≡ log
( Nt
Nt−1
)
= e
ga+
ac
1−ai
gv
( nC
nC + nI
(nˆC,t − nˆC,t−1) +
nI
nC + nI
(nˆI,t − nˆI,t−1) + zˆt +
ac
1− ai
vˆt
)
.
75
